PART IV. Containing Answers to Objections.

CHAP. I.

CONCERNING THE OBJECTION, THAT TO SUPPOSE MEN BORN IN SIN, WITHOUT THEIR CHOICE, OR ANY PREVIOUS ACT OF THEIR OWN, IS TO SUPPOSE WHAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATURE OF SIN.

Some of the objections made against the doctrine of original sin, which have reference to particular arguments used in defence of it, have been already considered in the handling of those arguments. What I shall therefore now consider, are such objections as I have not yet had occasion to notice.

There is no argument Dr. T. insists more upon, than that which is taken from the _Arminian _and _Pelagian _notion of freedom of will, consisting in the will’s _self-determination, _as necessary to the being of moral good or evil. He often urges, that if we come into the world infected with sinful and depraved dispositions, then _sin _must be _natural _to us; and if natural, then necessary; and if necessary, then _no _sin, nor any thing we are blamable for, or that can in any respect be our fault, being what we cannot help: and he urges, that sin must proceed from our own _choice, _&c. Page 125, 128-130, 186-188, 190, 200, 245, 246, 253, 258, 63, 64, 161. S. and other places.

Here I would observe in general, that the forementioned notion of freedom of will, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand favourite point with _Pelagians _and _Arminians, _and all divines of such characters, in their controversies with the orthodox. There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of religion: on the determination of this one leading point depends the issue of almost all controversies we have with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a _needless _task for me particularly to consider that matter in this place; having already largely discussed it, with all the main grounds of this notion, and the arguments used to defend it, in a late book on this subject, to which I ask leave to refer the reader. It is very necessary, that the modern prevailing doctrine concerning this point, should be well understood, and therefore thoroughly considered and examined: for without it there is no hope of putting an end to the controversy about original sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist, about many of the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern divines, if they can maintain their pecular notion of _freedom, _consisting in the _self-determining power of the will, _as necessary to _moral agency, _and can thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against it, then they have an impregnable castle, to which they may repair, and remain invincible, in all the controversies they have with the reformed divines, concerning _original sin, _the _sovereignty _of grace, _election, redemption, conversion, _the _efficacious operation _of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving faith, _perseverance _of the saints, and other principles of the like kind. However, at the same time, I think this will be as strong a fortress for the _Deists, _in common with them; as the great doctrines, subverted by their notion of _freedom, _are so plainly and abundantly taught in the Scripture. But I am under no apprehensions of any danger, which the cause of Christianity, or the religion of the reformed, is in, from any possibility of _that notion _being ever established, or of its being ever evinced that there is not proper, perfect, and manifold _demonstration _lying against it. But as I said, it would be needless for me to enter into a particular disquisition of this point here; from which I shall easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give himself the trouble of consulting what I have already written. And as to others, probably they will scarce be at the pains of reading the present discourse; or at least would not, if it should be enlarged by a full consideration of that controversy.

I shall at this time therefore only take notice of some gross _inconsistencies that Dr. T. has been guilty of, in his handling this objection against the doctrine of original sin. In places which have been cited, he says, that sin must proceed from our own choice: and that if it does not, it being necessary to us, it cannot be sin, it cannot be our fault, or what we are to blame for: and therefore all our sin must be chargeable on our choice, _which is the _cause _of sin: for he says, the cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, and which proceedeth from it. Page. 128 Now here are implied several gross contradictions. He greatly insists., that nothing can be _sinful, _or have the nature of sin, but what proceeds from our _choice. _Nevertheless he says, “Not the _effect, _but the _cause _alone is chargeable with blame.“ Therefore the _choice, _which is the _cause, _is _alone _blamable, or has the nature of sin; and not the _effect of _that choice. Thus nothing can be sinful, but the effect of choice; and yet the effect of choice never can be sinful, but only the _cause, _which alone is chargeable with all the blame.

Again, the _choice, _from which sin proceeds, is _itself _sinful. Not only is this implied in his saying, “The _cause alone is chargeable with all the blame;” but _he expressly speaks of the choice as faulty, Page 190. and calls that choice _wicked, _from which depravity and corruption proceeds. Page 200. See also p. 216. Now if the choice itself be _sin, _and there be no sin but what proceeds from a sinful choice, then the sinful choice must proceed from another _antecedent _choice; it must he chosen by a foregoing act of will, determining itself to that sinful choice, that so it may have that which he speaks of as absolutely essential to the nature of _sin, _namely, _that it proceeds from our choice, _and does not happen to us necessarily. But if the sinful choice itself proceeds from a foregoing choice, then also that foregoing choice must be sinful; it being the _cause of sin, _and so alone chargeable with the _blame. _Yet if that foregoing choice be sinful, then neither must _that _happen to us necessarily, but must like-wise proceed from choice, another act of choice preceding that: for we must remember, that “Nothing is sinful but what proceeds from our choice.“ And then, for the same reason, even this prior choice, last mentioned, must also be sinful, being chargeable with all the blame of that consequent evil choice, which was its effect. And so we must go back till we come to the very _first _volition, the prime or original act of choice in the whole chain. And _this _to be sure must be a _sinful _choice, because this is the _origin _or primitive _cause _of all the train of evils which follow; and according to our author, must therefore be “alone chargeable with all the blame.” And yet so it is, according to him, _this _“cannot be sinful,” because it does not “proceed from our own choice,” or any foregoing act of our will; it being, by the supposition, the very _first _act of will in the case. And therefore it must be _necessary, _as to us, having no choice of ours to be the cause of it.

In p. 232. he says, ”_Adam’s _sin was from his own disobedient will; and so must every man’s sin, and all the sin in the world be, as well as his.” By this, it seems, he must have a “disobedient will” _before _he sins; for the cause must be before the effect: and yet that disobedient will itself is sinful; otherwise it could not be called _disobedient. _But the question is, How do men come by the _disobedient will, _this cause of all the sin in the world? It must not come _necessarily, _without men’s choice; for if so, it is _not _sin, nor is there any _disobedience _in it. Therefore that disobedient will must also come from a disobedient will; and so on, in _infinitum. _Otherwise it must be supposed, that there is some _sin _in the world, which does not come from a disobedient will: contrary to our author’s dogmatical assertions.

In p. 166. S. he says, “Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination.” Here he calls that inclination itself _sinful, _which is the principle from whence sinful acts proceed; as elsewhere he speaks of the _disobedient will _from whence all sin comes: and he allows, Contents of Rom. chap. vii. in Notes on the epistle. that “the _law reaches to all the latent principles of sin;” meaning plainly, that it forbids, _and _threatens punishment _for, those latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these sinful inclinations, without which, according to our author, there can be no sinful act, cannot all proceed from a sinful choice; because that would imply great contradiction. For, by the supposition, they are the principles from whence a sinful choice comes, and whence all sinful acts of will proceed; and there can be no sinful act without them. So that the _first _latent principles and inclinations, from whence all sinful acts proceed, are sinful; and yet they are _not sinful, _because they do not proceed from a _wicked choice, _without which, according to him, “nothing can be sinful.”

Dr. T. speaking of that proposition of the _Assembly of Divines, _wherein they assert, that _man is by nature utterly corrupt, _&c. Page 125. thinks himself well warranted, by the supposed great evidence of these his contradictory notions, to say, “Therefore sin is not natural to us; and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this proposition in the _Assembly of Divines _is false.” But it may be worthy of consideration, whether it would not have greatly become him, before he had clothed himself with so much assurance, and proceeded, on the foundation of these his notions, so magisterially to charge the _Assembly’s _proposition with _falsehood, _to have taken care that his own propositions, which he has set in opposition to them, should be a little more consistent; that he might not have contradicted _himself, _while contradicting them; lest some impartial judges, observing his inconsistence, should think they had warrant to declare with equal assurance, that “they should not scruple to say, Dr. T.‘s doctrine is false.”

CHAP. II.

CONCERNING THE OBJECTION, AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF NATIVE CORRUPTION, THAT TO SUPPOSE MEN RECEIVE THEIR FIRST EXISTENCE IN SIN, IS TO MAKE HIM WHO IS THE AUTHOR OF THEIR BEING, THE AUTHOR OF THEIR DEPRAVITY.

One argument against a supposed native, sinful depravity, which Dr. T. greatly insists upon, is, “that this does in effect charge him, who is the author of our nature, who formed us in the womb, with being the author of a sinful corruption of nature; and that it is _highly injurious _to the God of our nature, _whose hands have formed and fashioned us, _to believe _our nature _to be _originally corrupted, _and that in the worst sense of corruption. P. 137, 187-189, 256, 258, 260, 143. S. and other places.

With respect to this, I would observe, in the first place, that this writer, in handling this grand objection, supposes something to _belong _to the doctrine objected against, as maintained by the divines whom he is opposing, which does _not _belong to it, nor follow from it. As particularly, he supposes the doctrine of original sin to imply, that nature must be corrupted by some positive influence; “something, by some means or other, _infused _into the human nature; some _quality _or other, not from the _choice _of our minds, but like a _taint, tincture, _or _infection, _altering the natural constitution, faculties, and dispositions of our souls. Page 187. That sin and evil dispositions are implanted in the fœtus in the womb.” Page 146, 148, 149. S. and the like in many other places. Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing. In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality, _infused, implanted, _or _wrought _into the nature of man, by any _positive _cause, or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature; or of supposing, that man is conceived and born with a _fountain of evil _in his heart, such as is any thing properly _positive. _I think, a little attention to the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy any impartial considerate inquirer, that the absence of positive good principles, and so the withholding of a special divine influence to impart and maintain those good principles—leaving the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, &c. to themselves, without the government of superior divine principles—will certainly be followed with the corruption; yea, the total corruption of the heart, without occasion for any _positive _influence at all: and that it was thus in fact that corruption of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall, and comes on all his posterity, as sinning in him, and falling with him. The sentiment contained in this paragraph, and illustrated in the following part of this chapter, is of the utmost importance, in order not only to remove Pelagian prejudices, and the cavils of modern philosophers, but also to give a just and consistent view of the nature and cause of sin; the cause of all sin in general, and original sin in particular. Our author’s explanation, which immediately follows, both in the text and in the note, is ingenious, and in some respects quite satisfactory. But a brief representation of the same result in another way, may demand some attention. 1. It is probably more philosophical, as well as more intelligible, in describing the two kinds of principles, as the author calls them, possessed by Adam, to say, that the inferior ones were, those faculties in man which constituted him a moral agent; rather than calling them “the principles of mere human nature.” The superior ones are very accurately described; but instead of calling them “supernatural principles;” they may more properly be termed, divine, benevolent, sovereign influence, superadded to those faculties which constituted adam a moral agent. This representation leads to the essential relations that subsist between God and his creature man. “Mere human nature,” and “supernatural principles” convey no distinctive character of relation. “Faculties which constitute a moral agent,” express the ground of relation between equity in God and accountableness in man; and “benevolent influences,” express the ground of relation between sovereignty in God and passiveness in man. 2. That Adam had such qualifications, or faculties, as rendered him a moral agent, independently of his spiritual knowledge, righteousness, holiness, dominion, honour, and glory—in other words, his divine light, holy life, and supreme love to God—is self-evident. For, after he had lost those excellencies, he was confessedly no less a moral agent, and accountable to his divine Governor and Judge for his temper, thoughts, desires, words, and works, than he was before he lost them. 3. The philosophical cause, or the true origin, of Adam’s defection, was his liberty in union with his passive power. For an explanation of these terms, and the proof of the proposition just laid down, we must refer the reader to our notes on the first volume of this work, where the subject is professedly discussed. 4. The true and ultimate cause of the first sin of Adam, of all his subsequent sins, and those of his posterity, whether infants or adults, is not essentially different. If the principles, as our author calls them, or the faculties and qualifications, which constitute moral agency and accountability, be left to themselves—whereby they become influenced by passive power, not counteracted by sovereign, benevolent, or holy divine influence—the effect will be the same, though attended with different circumstances. 5. When the cause of Adam’s integrity, perfection, spirituality, and happiness, or his paradisiacal life, was no longer operative for his preservation, defection ensued; which consisted in the loss of the chief good, together with that disorder, confusion, and a conscious exposedness to a continuance in that state, whereby happiness was necessarily exchanged for a restless uneasiness, called misery. 6. This was the case of Adam in his own person. But our author, in the next chapter, excellently shows, that Adam and all his posterity were strictly one. This union we may call a systematic whole. For mankind, or the whole race of man, has a constituted connexion, no less than a seed with its plant; for instance, the acorn with the oak-plant, and that with its future branches. We justly called it the same tree from the time it was planted to its utmost longevity, though some of its branches came into existence a hundred years or more after the first shoot. This union of Adam with his posterity, is no less a constituted union, than that which connects the solar system; or any other inferior systematic whole, as an animal body, which is regarded as one from its birth till its death. For instance, nothing but a constitution founded in the sovereign pleasure of God, caused the body of Methuselah to be the same, or regarded as the same, when in infancy, and above nine hundred years after. The parts of his body, at least most of them, were as different in old age, compared with his infancy, as any of his posterity are different from Adam. In each case alike, the appointment of God in forming a course of nature, or his operations according to a constituted plan, could make the body of Methuselah to be the same body from the first to the last; and the posterity of Adam the same with himself. 7. In every vital system there is a vital part, and in every other system, as such, one part is more essential than another. Adam was the vital part of the system of mankind.—The root of the tree, the foundation of the building, the main spring of the machine, the sun of the system. We his posterity are but so many members of a body, and are all dependent on him as on our head or heart; but not so on one another. There may be the amputation of a limb, while the other limbs are not injured; but if the head or heart be deprived of life, all the members are deprived at the same time. A branch of a tree may be lopped off without injury to the other part; but if the root, the vital part, be affected, all the branches are also affected as the necessary consequence. A dead root and a living tree are incompatible; though a dead branch and a living branch of the same tree are not. A watch is a system formed on principles of mechanism, the index may be mutilated, or the cog of a wheel may be broken and detached, without affecting the more essential parts; but if the main spring be broken, the whole system, as to its designed use, is destroyed. A building is a system; a slate or a chimney may be blown down, without affecting the foundation, but if the whole foundation be undermined, the whole fabric must fall to ruin. The solar system might subsist, for ought that appears to the contrary, though a comet, a satellite, or a planet, were annihilated; but if the sun were annihilated, ruin and confusion must ensue. 8. Whatever Adam lost by transgression, he could have no claim either in equity or by promise, that is, he could have no claim at all, for a restoration of it. And what he could have no claim for himself, could not be claimable by or for his posterity; any more than a branch or a member could obtain life, when the root of that branch or the head of that member had ceased to live; or any more than the subordinate parts of any system when the radical, vital, fundamental, and essential parts had failed. 9. What Adam lost was the divine life, and the happiness implied in it, as a favour granted on a condition. Observing the condition, he was to have it continued; but on breaking the condition, it was to be forfeited. Adam may be compared to a lord in waiting, who should have free access to every room in the king’s palace one excepted. By abstaining from this intrusion, he should have his honour and dignity preserved, and confirmed to his heirs for ever; but by offending as to the condition prescribed, he must sink to the rank of a common subject, stripped of all his former dignity. How absurd would it be for the heirs of such a lord to step forward and claim what he had forfeited! Equally absurd is it to say, that Adam’s posterity are no suffers by his transgression. 10. If we would form accurate notions of Adam’s transgression, original sin, and the imputation of guilt, it will be of the utmost importance to consider the divine law, by which is the knowledge of sin, under a twofold consideration. As a rule requiring conformity and obedience in every period of our existence, or the measure of moral obligation; and as a covenant, the condition of which was perfect conformity and obedience, under forfeiture of a special favour. The law as a rule may be transgressed times and methods innumerable; but as a covenant it could be transgressed only once. For the very first offence was a breach of the condition, and a forfeiture of that favour which depended on the performance of that condition. It is possible for the transgressor of the law as a rule to become, through grace, a perfect character, and therefore perfectly conformable to that law. But to be perfectly conformable to the required condition, once broken, is impossible; as impossible as to recall time once past, or to make transgression to be no transgression. 11. Our author very justly remarks that “there is not the least, need of supposing any evil quality infused, implanted, or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive cause or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature; or of supposing, that man is conceived and born with a foundation of evil in his heart, such as in any thing properly positive.” But however just this remark, there is reason to fear that many beside Dr. Taylor have imbibed a notion of original sin considerably different from what is here asserted. It is not improbable that the terms by which the evil has been commonly expressed without a due examination of the idea intended, have had no small influence to effect this. The frequent use of such analogical and allusive terms as pollution, defilement, corruption, contamination, and the like, seems to imitate something positive; as these expressions in their original meaning convey an idea of something superadded to the subject. Whereas other terms, though equally analogical and allusive, imply no such thing; such as, disorder, discord, confusion, and the like. We do not mean to condemn the use of the former, or to recommend the latter to their exclusion; but only design to caution against a wrong inference from a frequent use of them. 12. On the subject of the imputation of Adam’s offence to his posterity, our author, in the next chapter, has treated very ably and fully. But we may here observe, that it is of the greatest importance to have just views of what is called original guilt. It is to be feared that many form very confused notions of the subject, when it is said. “we are all guilty when born,” or “we are all guilty of Adam’s transgression,” or “the guilt of Adam’s offence is ours.” Though we conceive these, and similar propositions, to be expressive of an important truth; yet we are no less liable to be led astray from the true idea referred to by these expressions, than by others employed to represent moral depravity. 13. It may contribute to a clearness of conception on the subject, if we keep in mind, that Adam was guilty by his first offence, under a twofold consideration. He was guilty of a breach of law considered as a rule of rectitude, and of the same law as a covenant enjoining the observance of a special duty, which was the avowed and express condition of it. The performance of the condition was to secure not merely moral purity and innocence, but also the favour, or gracious benefit, which he possessed on the footing of a sovereign grant. This was his federal privilege. How by the transgression of the law, considered as a covenant, this favour was forfeited; and for God to treat him as one deprived of this favour, is the same thing as to treat him as guilty. For how could he be treated otherwise, when the very condition on which he retained the favour was broken? 14. Whatever Adam possessed, beyond those considerations which constituted him a moral agent, was the fruit of sovereign benevolence. Hence arises the propriety of regarding the possession of his privilege, on the observance of a specified condition, under the term covenant. For, if Adam possessed some spiritual principles, or benevolent influences, as a person possesses immunities and privileges by charter for himself and his heirs; and if these chartered benefits be retained on condition of not offending in a specified manner; it follows, that a privation of such benefits belongs as much to the heirs as to the individual offending. But if they are treated for breach of such covenant, or charter held on condition, as persons included in the forfeiture, it is manifest they are regarded so far guilty or worthy to suffer such loss. 15. From these considerations it follows that Adam’s breach of law as a rule which brought guilt upon him as an individual, is not the guilt imputable to his posterity. During his long life, no doubt, he was guilty of innumerable offences after the first transgression, but not one of these is imputed to us; the reason is, that after he broke the condition of the charter, he stood upon the bare ground of personal moral obligation. But personal guilt, on such ground, cannot in equity be transferred from one to another. The sins of the father, whether the first father or any other, considered merely as a personal deviation from rectitude, or a breach of moral obligation, cannot be imputed to the children. 16. What Adam, therefore, suffered for breach of covenant, was a privation of chartered benefits. The unavoidable effect of this was, DEATH; a privation of spiritual life—which continued is death eternal—and a privation of that protection and care which would have preserved from temporal death. There seems little room to doubt that even the corporeal, or elementary part of Adam underwent a great change by the fall. However, having forfeited his charter of preservation by transgression, he and all his posterity became exposed to the natural operations of this world and its elements. Matter and motion, in animals and vegetables, in the natural state of things, insure a dissolution. 17. Much has been said by some divines, about the probability of Adam, had he kept the condition, being promoted to some situation still more exalted. But there is reason to suspect, that such a sentiment proceeds on the supposition of Adam possessing a less exalted situation than he really did possess. The idea seems to be founded on a probable promotion for continued obedience. But what could be a greater reward than a continuance of chartered privileges? And what greater loss than their forfeiture? 18. It would not be difficult to demonstrate, were not this note too far extended to admit of it, that Adam, dealt with on the ground of strict equity, would have been not less liable to defection than his posterity are, when they begin to exercise moral agency. Therefore, the objection against the constitution of Adam and his posterity being regarded as one, is deprived of all force. For, whatever creature, in whatever world, were dealt with in strict equity, without benevolent influence to counteract passive power, he would have no advantages against a liability to defection above the race of man after the fall. The only difference is, that Adam once actually possessed an exalted privilege, and fell from it. And if his posterity, rendered so far guilty as to be deprived of chartered benefits with him, cannot be raised to happiness from their fallen state without the exercise of benevolent sovereign influence in the plan of salvation: it should be recollected, that Adam himself could not have maintained his standing but by the same benevolent sovereign influence, though exercised in a different way. COROLLARY. 19. Hence the propriety and the true ground of the well known distinction of a believer in the second Adam not being under the law (i.e. the condemnation of the law) as a covenant, though under the law as a rule. It is found, as to its true reason, in the state of Adam, as above explained.—W

The case with man was plainly this: When God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an _inferior _kind, which may be called natural, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the _nature of man, _in which his love to his own liberty, honour, and pleasure, were exercised: these, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call flesh. Besides these, there were _superior _principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man’s righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the divine nature. These principles may, in some sense, be called supernatural, To prevent all cavils, the reader is desired particularly to observe, in what sense I here use the words natural and supernatural:—Not as epithets of distinction between that which is concreated or connate, and that which is extraordinarily introduced afterwards, besides the first state of things, or the order established originally, beginning when man’s nature began; but as distinguishing between what belongs to, or flows from, that nature which man has, merely as man, and those things which are above this, by which one is denominated, not only a man, but a truly virtuous, holy, and spiritual man; which, though they began in Adam as soon as humanity began, and are necessary to the perfection and well-being of the human nature, yet are not essential to the constitution of it, or necessary to its being: inasmuch as one may have every thing to his being man, exclusively of them. If in thus using the words, natural and supernatural, I use them in an uncommon sense, it is not from any affectation of singularity, but for want of other terms more aptly to express my meaning. being (however concreated or connate, yet) such as are _above _those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, mere human nature; and being such as immediately depend on man’s union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God’s Spirit: which though withdrawn, and man’s nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature still; man’s nature, as such, being entire without these divine _principles, which the Scripture sometimes calls spirit, in contradistinction to flesh. _These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart; the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all was in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in a proper and perfect state. These divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man’s nature. When man sinned and broke God’s covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion with God on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the constitution God had established, that he should still maintain communion with man, and continue by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God’s wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woful corruption, and ruin; nothing but _flesh _without _spirit. _The inferior principles of self-love, and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, _of course _became reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a _fatal catastrophe, _a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man immediately set up _himself, _and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they took the place of god. These inferior principles are like _fire _in a house; which, we say, is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction. Man’s love to his own honour, separate interest, and private pleasure, which before was _wholly subordinate _unto love to God, and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels him to pursue those objects, without regard to _God’s _honour, or law; because there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as much when _against _God’s honour and law, as when _agreeable _to them. God still continuing strictly to require _supreme _regard to himself, and forbidding all undue gratifications of these inferior passions—but only in perfect subordination to the ends, and agreeableness to the rules and limits, which his holiness, honour, and law prescribe—hence immediately arises _enmity _in the heart, now wholly under the power of self-love; and nothing but _war _ensues, in a constant course, against God. As, when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were easy to show, how every lust, and depraved disposition of man’s heart, would naturally arise from this _private _original, if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to give an account, how total corruption of heart should follow on man’s eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, _without God putting _any evil into his heart, or _implanting _any bad principle, or _infusing _any corrupt taint, and so becoming the _author _of depravity. Only God’s _withdrawing, _as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel-man, and his _natural _principles being _left to themselves, _is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God.

And as _Adam’s _nature became corrupt, without God’s implanting or infusing of any evil thing into it; so does the nature of his _posterity. _God dealing with Adam as the head of his posterity, (as has been shown,) and treating them as one, he deals with his posterity as having _all sinned in him. _And therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion, and his vital gracious influence, from the common head, so he withholds the same from all the members, as they come into existence; whereby they come into the world mere _flesh, _and entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt, as Adam did.

Now, for God so far to have the disposal of this affair, as to _withhold _those influences, without which, _nature _will be _corrupt, _is not to be the _author of sin. _But, concerning this, I must refer the reader to what I have said of it in my discourse on the Freedom of the Will. Part iv. § 9. Though, besides what I have there said, I may here observe, that if for God so far to order and dispose the being of sin, as to _permit _it, by withholding the gracious influences necessary to prevent it, is for him to be the author of sin, then some things which Dr. T. himself lays down, will equally be attended with this very consequence. For, from time to time he speaks of God giving men up to the vilest lusts and affections, by _permitting, _or _leaving _them. Key, § 388, note: and Par. on Rom. i. 24, 36. Now, if the _continuance of sin, _and its increase and prevalence, may be in consequence of God’s disposal, in withholding needful grace, without God being the author of that _continuance _and prevalence of sin; then, by parity of reason, may the _being of sin, _in the race of _Adam, _be in consequence of Gods disposal, by his withholding that grace which is needful to prevent it, without his being the author of sin.

If here it should be said, that God is not the author of sin, in giving up to sin those who have already made themselves sinful, because when men have once made themselves sinful, their continuing so, and sin prevailing in them, and becoming more and more habitual, will follow in a course of nature: I answer, let that be remembered which this writer so greatly urges, in opposition to them who suppose original corruption comes in a course of nature, _viz. That the course of nature is nothing without God. _He utterly rejects the notion of the ”_course of nature’s _being a proper active cause, which will work, and go on by itself, _without God, _if he lets or permits it.” Page 134. S. See also with what vehemence this is urged in p. 137. S. But affirms, “That the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is _no cause _or nothing; and that the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than at first produce itself, is absolutely impossible.“ These strong expressions are his. Therefore, to explain the continuance of the habits of sin in the same person, when once introduced, yea, to explain the very being of any such habits, in consequence of repeated acts, our author must have recourse to those same principles, which he rejects as absurd to the utmost degree, when alleged to explain the corruption of nature in the posterity of Adam. For, that habits, either good or bad, should _continue, _after being once established, or that habits should be settled and have existence in consequence of repeated acts, can be owing only to _a course of nature, _and those _laws of nature _which God has established.

That the posterity of _Adam _should be born without holiness, and so with a depraved nature, comes to pass as much by the _established course of nature, _as the continuance of a corrupt disposition in a particular person, after he once has it; or as much as _Adam’s _continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had once lost his holiness. For _Adam’s _posterity are from him, and as it were in him, and belonging to Him, according to an _established course of nature, _as much as the branches of a tree are, according to a _course of nature, _from the tree, in the tree, and belonging to the tree; or, (to make use of the comparison which Dr. T. himself chooses from time to time, as proper to illustrate the matter, Page 146, 187. ) _just as the acorn is derived from the oak. _And I think, the acorn is as much derived from the oak, according to the _course of nature, _as the buds and branches. It is true, that God, by his own almighty power, creates the _soul _of the infant; and it is also _true, _as Dr. T. often insists, that God, by his immediate power, forms and fashions the _body _of the infant in the womb; yet he does both according to that _course of nature, _which he has been pleased to establish. The course of nature is demonstrated, by late improvements in philosophy, to be indeed what our author himself says it is, _viz. _Nothing but the established order of the agency and operation of the author of nature. And though there be the immediate agency of God in bringing the soul into existence in generation, yet it is done according to the method and order established by the author of nature, as much as his producing the bud, or the acorn of the oak; and as much as his continuing a particular person in being, after he once has existence. God’s immediate agency in bringing the soul of a child into being, is as much according to an _established order, _as his immediate agency in any of the works of nature whatsoever. It is agreeable to the established order of nature, that the good qualities wanting in the _tree, _should also be wanting in the _branches and fruit. _It is agreeable to the order of nature, that when a particular person is without good moral qualities in his heart, he should continue without them, till some new cause or efficiency produces them. And it is as much agreeable to an established course and order of nature, that since Adam, the head of mankind, the root of that great tree with many branches springing from it, was deprived of original righteousness, the branches should come forth without it. Or, if any dislike the word _nature, _as used in this last case, and instead of it choose to call it a _constitution, _or _established order _of successive events, the alteration of the name will not in the least alter the state of the present argument. Where the name, _nature, _is allowed without dispute, no more is meant than an established method and order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom.

If any should object to this, that if the want of original righteousness be thus according to an established course of _nature, _then why are not principles of holiness, when restored by divine _grace, _also communicated to posterity; I answer, The divine law and establishments of the author of _nature, _are precisely settled by him as he pleaseth, and limited by his wisdom. _Grace _is introduced among the race of man by a new establishment; not on the ground of God’s original establishment, as the head of the natural world, and author of the first creation; but by a constitution of a vastly higher kind; wherein _Christ _is made the _root _of the tree, whose branches are his spiritual _seed, _and he is the _head _of the new creation; of which I need not stand now to speak particularly.

But here I desire it may be noted, that I do not suppose the natural depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature only; it is also owing to the just _judgment _of God. But yet I think, it is as truly and in the same manner owing to the course of _nature, _that Adam’s posterity come into the world without original righteousness, as that Adam himself continued without it, after he had once lost it. That Adam continued destitute of holiness, when he had lost it, and would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a Redeemer, was not only a _natural _consequence, according to the course of things established by God, as the author of nature; but it was also a _penal _consequence, or a punishment of his sin. God, in righteous _judgment, _continued to absent himself from Adam after he became a rebel; and withheld from him now those influences of the Holy Spirit, which he before had. And just thus I suppose it to be with every natural branch of mankind: all are looked upon as _sinning _in and with their common root; and God righteously withholds special influences and spiritual communications from all, for this sin. But of the manner and order of these things, more may be said in the next chapter.

On the whole, this grand objection against the doctrine of men being born corrupt, that it makes him who _gave us our being, _to be the cause of the _being of corruption, _can have no more force in it, than a like argument has to prove, that if men by a course of nature _continue _wicked, or remain without goodness, after they have by vicious acts contracted vicious habits, and so made themselves wicked, it makes him, who is the cause of their continuance _in being, _and the cause of the continuance _of the course of nature, to be the cause of their continued wickedness. _Dr. T. says, Page 136. S. “God would not _make _any thing that is _hateful _to him; because, by the very terms, he would hate to make such a thing.” But if this be good arguing in the case to which it is applied, may I not as well say, God would not continue a thing in being that is hateful to him; because, by the very terms, he would hate to continue such a thing in being? I think, the very terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these propositions, as the other. In like manner, the rest that he says on that head may be shown to be unreasonable, by only substituting the word _continue, _in the place of _make _and _propagate. _I may fairly imitate his way of reasoning thus: to say, God _continues _us according to his own original decree, or law of _continuation, _which obliges him to _continue _us in a manner he abhors, is really to make bad worse: for it is supposing him to be defective in wisdom, or by his own decree or law to lay such a constraint upon his own actions, that he cannot do what he would, but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he condemns in us; viz. _continuing _us sinful when he condemns us for _continuing _ourselves sinful.” If the reasoning be _weak _in the one case, it is no less so in the other.

If any shall still insist, that there is a _difference _between God so disposing things, as that depravity of heart shall be _continued, _according to the settled course of nature, in the same person, who has by his own fault introduced it; and his so disposing as that men, according to a course of nature, should be _born _with depravity, in consequence of Adam’s introducing of sin, by his act which we had no concern in, and cannot be justly charged with: on this I would observe, that it is quite going off the objection, which we have been upon, from God’s agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on, that _simply _for him, from whose agency the course of nature and our existence derive, so to dispose things as that we should have existence in a corrupt state, is for him to be the author of sin: but the plea now advanced is, that it is not proper and just for such an agent so to dispose, _in this case, _and only in consequence of Adam’s sin; it not being just to charge Adam’s sin to his posterity. And this matter shall be particularly considered, in answer to the next objection; to which I now proceed.

CHAP. III.

THAT GREAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE IMPUTATION OF ADAM’S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY, CONSIDERED, THAT SUCH IMPUTATION IS UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE, INASMUCH AS ADAM AND HIS POSTERITY ARE NOT ONE AND THE SAME. WITH A BRIEF REFLECTION SUBJOINED OF WHAT SOME HAVE SUPPOSED, OF GOD IMPUTING THE GUILT OF ADAM’S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY, BUT IN AN INFINITELY LESS DEGREE THAN TO ADAM HIMSELF.

That we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main objections against supposing the guilt of Adam’s sin to be imputed to his posterity; I would premise some observations with a view to the right _stating _of the doctrine; and then show its _reasonableness, _in opposition to the great clamour raised against it on this head.

I think, it would go far towards directing us to the more clear conception and right statement of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind: that God, in every step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being _one with him. _And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the _head _of the whole body, and the _root _of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their root.

From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam’s posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all co-existed, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root had been attended, at the same instant, with the same alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think, this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a _constituted oneness _or _identity _of Adam and his posterity in this affair.

Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a _double guilt, _one the guilt of Adam’s sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The _guilt _a man has upon his soul at first existence, is one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original apostacy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as _two _things, _distinctly _imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God. Indeed the guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart, as it remains a confirmed principle, and appears in its consequent operations, is a _distinct and additional _guilt: but the guilt arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam’s posterity, I apprehend, is _not _distinct from their guilt of Adam’s first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil disposition or inclination of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct from his first act of sin, but was included in it. The external act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceeded from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt he had _double, _as for two distinct sins: one, the wickedness of his will in that affair; another, the wickedness of the external act, caused by it. His guilt was all truly from the act of his inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body were no more than the motions of any lifeless instrument. His sin consisted in wickedness of heart, fully sufficient _for, _and entirely amounting _to, _all that appeared in the act he committed.

The depraved disposition of _Adam’s heart is to be considered two ways. (1.) As the first rising _of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2.) An evil disposition of heart _continuing _afterwards, as a confirmed principle that came by God’s forsaking of him; which was a _punishment _of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his soul.

In like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam’s posterity. The _first listing _of a corrupt disposition, is not to be looked upon as sin _distinct _from their participation of Adam’s first sin. It is as it were the _extended pollution _of that sin, through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted _union _of the branches with the root; or the _inherence _of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in their consent and concurrence with the head in that first act. But the depravity of nature remaining as an _established principle _in a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after-operations, is a _consequence _and _punishment _of the first apostacy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The _first being _of an evil disposition in a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to _approve _the sin of his first father, so far as to imply a full and perfect _consent _of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam’s own heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation, but rather _prior _to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation or the evil disposition to Adam’s posterity, or rather, the _co-existence _of the evil disposition, implied in _Adam’s _first rebellion, in the _root _and _branches, _is a consequence of the _union _that the wise Author of the world has established between _Adam _and his posterity; but not properly a _consequence _of the _imputation _of his sin; nay, is rather _antecedent _to it, as it was in _Adam _himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is _first, _and the charge of guilt _consequent, _as it was in the case of _Adam _himself. My meaning, in the whole of what has been said, may be illustrated thus: Let us suppose that Adam and all his posterity had co-existed, and that his posterity had been, through a law of nature established by the Creator, united to him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the root, or the members of the body to the head, so as to constitute as it were one complex person, or one moral whole: so that by the law of union there should have been a communion and co-existence in acts and affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as one whole, in the disposition and action of the head: as we see in the body natural, the whole body is affected as the head is affected; and the whole body concurs when the head acts. Now, in this case, all the branches of mankind, by the constitution of nature and law of union, would have been affected just as Adam, their common root, was affected. When the heart of a root, by a full disposition, committed the first sin, the hearts of all the branches would have concurred; and when the root, in consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the branches; and when the root, as a punishment of the sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like manner would it have fared with all the branches; and when the root, in consequence of this, was confirmed in permanent depravity, the case would have been the same with all the branches; and as new guilt on the soul of Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been with his moral branches. And thus all things, with relation to evil disposition, guilt, pollution, and depravity, would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each branch, as in the root. Now, difference of the time of existence does not at all hinder things succeeding in the same order, any more than difference of place in a co-existence of time. Here may be observed, as in several respects to the present purpose, some things are said by STAPFERUS, an eminent divine of Zurich, in Switzerland, in his Theologia Polemica, published about fourteen years ago:—in English as follows. “Seeing all Adam’s posterity are derived from their first parent, as their root, the whole of human kind, with its root, may be considered as constituting but one whole, or one mass; so as not to be properly distinct from its root; the posterity not differing from it, any otherwise than the branches of from the tree. From which it easily appears, how that when the root sinned, all which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one whole, may be looked upon as also sinning; seeing it is not distinct from the root, but one with it.”—Tom. i. cap. 3. § 856. 57. “It is objected, against the imputation of Adam’s sin, that we never committed the same sin with Adam, neither in number or in kind. I answer, we should distinguish here between the physical act itself, which Adam committed, and the morality of the action, and consent to it. If we have respect only to the external act, to be sure it must be confessed, that Adam’s posterity did not put forth their hands to the forbidden fruit: in which sense, that act of transgression, and that fall of Adam, cannot be physically one with the sin of his posterity. But if we consider the morality of the action, and what consent there is to it, it is altogether to be maintained, that his posterity committed the same sin, both in number and in kind, inasmuch as they are to be looked upon as consenting to it. For where there is consent to a sin, there the same sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam with all his posterity constitute but one moral person, and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law, they are also to be looked upon as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of the law, both in number and in kind. Therefore this reasoning avails nothing against the righteous imputation of the sin of Adam to all mankind or to the whole moral person that is consenting to it. And for the reason mentioned, we may rather argue thus: the sin of the posterity, on account of their consent, and the moral view in which they are to be taken, is the same with the sin of Adam, not only in kind, but in number; therefore the sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his posterity.”—Id. Tom. iv. cap. 16. § 60, 61. The imputation of Adam’s first sin consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him. But seeing, agreeable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous judgment, which was founded on his most righteous law, give Adam a posterity that were like himself; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the very laws of nature: therefore he might also in righteous judgment impute Adam’s sin to them, inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity like himself, and to impute his sin to them, is one and the same thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter. Our adversaries contend with us chiefly on this account, that according to our doctrine of original sin, such an imputation of the first sin is maintained, whereby God, without any regard to universal native corruption, esteems all Adam’s posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to condemnation, purely on account of that sinful act of their first parent: so that they without any respect had to their own sin, and so, as innocent in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment.—I have therefore ever been careful to show, that they do injurously suppose those things to be separated in our doctrine which are by no means separated. The whole of the controversy they have with us about this matter, evidently arises from this, that they suppose the mediate and the immediate imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the matter of conception, but in reality. And so indeed they consider imputation only as immediate and abstractly from the mediate; when yet our divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Therefore I chose not to use any such distinction, or to suppose any such thing, in what I have said on the subject: but only have endeavoured to explain the thing itself, and to reconcile it with divine attributes. And therefore I have everywhere conjoined both these conceptions concerning the imputation of the first sin, as inseparable; and judged, that one ought never to be considered without the other.—While I have been writing this note, I consulted all the systems of divinity, which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair: and I found that they were of the same mind with me: namely, that these two kinds of imputation are by no means to be separated, or to be considered abstractly one from the other, but that one does involve the other.” He there particularly cites these two famous reformed divines, Vitringa and Lampins. Tom. iv. cap 17. § 78.

The first existence of an evil disposition, amounting to a full consent to _Adam’s _sin, no more infers God being the author of that evil disposition in the _child, _than in the _father. _The first arising or existing of that evil disposition in the heart of _Adam, _was by God’s permission; who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by _giving _such influences of his Spirit, as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it; which, it is plain in fact, he did withhold: and whatever mystery may be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian will presume to say, it was not in perfect consistence with God’s _holiness _and _righteousness, _notwithstanding Adam had been guilty of no offence before. So root and branches being one, according to God’s wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by virtue of this oneness answerable changes or effects through all the _branches _co-exist with the changes in the root: consequently an evil disposition exists in the hearts of Adam’s posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted in his own heart, when he eat the forbidden fruit. Which God has no hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an influence, as might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was observed in the former chapter. See also p. 39, note, § 8, &c. 48 § 12, &c. 80 § 9, &c. 82§ 17, &c. 121 § 7, &c.

But now the grand objection is against the _reasonableness _of such a _constitution, _by which _Adam _and his posterity should be looked upon as one, and dealt with accordingly, in an affair of such infinite consequence; so that if _Adam _sinned, they must necessarily be made _sinners _by his disobedience, and come into existence with the same _depravity _of disposition, and be looked upon and treated as though they were partakers with him in his act of sin. I have not room here to rehearse all Dr. T.‘s vehement exclamations against the reasonableness and justice of this. The reader may at his leisure consult his book, and see them in the places referred to below. Page 13. 150, 151, 156, 261. 108, 109, 111. S. Whatever black colours and frightful representations are employed on this occasion, all may be summed up in this, That _Adam _and his posterity are _not one, _but entirely _distinct agents. _But with respect to this mighty outcry made against the _reasonableness _of any such _constitution, _by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his posterity as one, I would make the following observations.

I. It signifies nothing to exclaim against plain _fact. _Such is the _fact, _the most evident and acknowledged fact, with respect to the state of all mankind, without exception of one individual among all the natural descendants of _Adam, _as makes it apparent, that God actually deals with Adam and his posterity as _one, _in reference to his apostacy, and its infinitely terrible consequences. It has been demonstrated, and shewn to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every individual of mankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as that there is no hope or possibility of any other than their violating God’s holy law, (if they ever live to act at all as moral agents,) and being thereby justly exposed to eternal ruin. Part I. Chap. I, the three first sections. And God either thus deals with mankind, because he looks upon them as _one _with their first father, and so treats them as _sinful _and _guilty _by his apostacy; or (which will not mend the matter) he, _without _viewing them as at all concerned in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly _innocent, _subjects them nevertheless to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam by his sin was exposed to the _calamities and sorrows of this life, _to temporal death and eternal ruin; as is confessed. And it is also in effect confessed, that all his posterity come into the world in such a state, as that the certain consequence is their being _exposed, _and _justly _so, to the _sorrows of this life, _to _temporal death and eternal ruin, _unless saved by grace. So that we see, God _in fact _deals with them together, or as _one. _If God orders the consequences of Adam’s sin, with regard to his posterity’s welfare—even in those things which are most important, and which in the highest degree concern their eternal interest— to be the _same _with the consequences to Adam himself, then he treats Adam and his posterity as one in that affair. Hence, however the matter be attended with difficulty, _fact _obliges us to _get over _it, either by finding out some solution, or by shutting our mouths, and acknowledging the weakness and scantiness of our understandings; as we must in other innumerable cases, where apparent and undeniable fact, in God’s works of creation and providence, is attended with events and circumstances, the _manner _and _reason _of which are difficult to our understandings.—But to proceed.

II. We will consider the _difficulties _themselves, insisted on in the objections of our opposers. They may be reduced to these two: _First, _That such a constitution is _injurious _to Adam’s posterity. _Secondly, _That it is altogether _improper, as it implies falsehood, _viewing and treating those as one, which indeed are not one, but entirely distinct.

First _difficulty, _That appointing _Adam _to stand, in this great affair, as the moral _head _of his posterity, and so treating them as _one _with him, as standing or falling with him, is _injurious _to them. To which I answer, it is demonstrably otherwise; that such a constitution was so far from being _injurious _to Adam’s posterity, any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered, attended with a more eligible _probability _of a _happy _issue than the latter would have been: and so a constitution that truly expresses _the goodness _of its Author. For,

1. It is reasonable to suppose, that _Adam _was _as likely, _on account of his capacity and natural talents, to _persevere _in obedience, as his posterity, (taking one with another,) if they had all been put on the trial singly for themselves. And supposing that there was a constituted union or oneness of him and his posterity, and that he stood as a public person, or common head, all by this constitution would have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience, as of the ill consequence of his disobedience, in case of his fall.

2. There was a _greater tendency _to a happy issue, in such an appointment, than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself; especially on two accounts. (1.) That _Adam _had _stronger motives to watchfulness _than his posterity would have had; in that not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake, but also that of all his posterity: (2.) _Adam _was in a state of complete _manhood, _when his trial began. It was a constitution very agreeable to the _goodness _of God, considering the state of mankind, which was to be propagated in the way of generation, that their _first father _should be appointed to stand for all. For by reason of the manner of their coming into existence in a state of _infancy, _and their coming so gradually to _mature _state, and so remaining for a great while in a state of childhood and comparative imperfection, after they were become moral agents, they would be _less fit _to stand for themselves, than their first lather to stand for them.

If any man, notwithstanding these things, shall say, that for his own part, if the affair had been proposed to him, _he _should have _chosen _to have had his eternal interest trusted in _his own _hands: it is sufficient to answer, that no man’s vain opinion of himself, as _more fit _to be trusted than others, alters the true nature and tendency of things, as they demonstrably are in themselves. Nor is it a just objection, that this constitution has in _event _proved for the _hurt _of mankind. For it does not follow, that no advantage was given for a _happy event, _in such an establishment, because it was not such as to make it utterly impossible there should be any other event.

3. The _goodness _of God in such a constitution with _Adam _appears in this: that if there had been no _sovereign gracious _establishment at all, but God had proceeded only on the basis of mere _justice, _and had gone no further than this required, he might have demanded of _Adam _and all his posterity, that they should perform _perfect perpetual obedience, without ever failing in the least instance, on pain of eternal death; _and might have made this demand _without _the _promise _of any positive _reward _for their obedience. For perfect obedience is a _debt, _that every one owes to his Creator; and therefore is what his Creator was not obliged to pay him for. None is obliged to pay his debtor for discharging his just debt.—But such was evidently the constitution with Adam, that an eternal happy life was to be the consequence of his persevering fidelity, to all such as were included within that constitution, (of which the _tree of life _was a sign,) as well as eternal death to be the consequence of his disobedience.—I come now to consider the

Second difficulty.—It being thus manifest, that this constitution, by which _Adam _and his posterity are dealt with as _one, _is not unreasonable on account of its being _injurious _and _hurtful _to the interest of mankind, the only thing remaining in the objection, against such a constitution, is the _impropriety _of it, as implying _falsehood, _and contradiction to the true nature of things; as hereby they are viewed and treated _as one, _who are _not _one, but wholly distinct; and no arbitrary constitution can ever make that to be true, which in itself considered is not true.

This objection, however specious, is really founded on a false hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call _sameness _or _oneness, _among created things; and the seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the _degree, _in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the supreme Author and Disposer of the universe.

Some things are _entirely distinct, _and _very diverse, _which yet are so united by the established law of the Creator, that by virtue of that establishment, they are in a sense one. Thus a _tree, _grown great, and a hundred years old, is _one _plant with the little _sprout, _that first came out of the ground from whence it grew, and has been continued in constant succession; though it is now so exceeding _diverse, _many thousand times bigger, and of a very different form, and perhaps not one atom the very same: yet God, according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession communicated to it many of the same qualities, and most important properties, as if it were _one. _It has been his pleasure, to constitute an union in these respects, and for these purposes, naturally leading us to look upon all as _one.—_So the _body _of _man _at forty years of age, is _one _with the _infant body _which first came into the world, from whence it grew; though now constituted of different substance, and the greater part of the substance probably changed scores (if not hundreds) of times: and though it be now in so many respects exceeding diverse, yet God, according to the course of nature, which he has been pleased to establish, has caused, that in a certain method it should communicate with that _infantile _body, in the same life, the same senses, the same features, and many the same qualities, and in union with the same soul; and so, with regard to these purposes, it is dealt with by him as _one _body. Again, the _body _and _soul _of a man are _one, _in a very different manner, and for different purposes. Considered in themselves, they are exceeding different beings, of a nature as diverse as can be conceived; and yet, by a very peculiar divine constitution, or law of nature, which God has been pleased to establish, they are strongly united, and become _one, _in most important respects; a wonderful mutual communication is established; so that both become different parts of the _same man. _But the union and mutual communication they have, has existence, and is entirely regulated and limited, according to the sovereign pleasure of God, and the constitution he has been pleased to establish.

And if we come even to the _personal identity _of created intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist _wholly _in what Mr. Locke supposes, i. e. Same consciousness; yet I think it cannot be denied, that this is one thing essential to it. But it is evident, that the communication or continuance of the same consciousness and memory to any subject, through successive parts of duration, depends wholly on a divine establishment. There would be no necessity, that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator.—If any should here insist, that there is no need of having recourse to any such _constitution, _in order to account for the continuance of the same consciousness; and should say, that the very _nature _of the soul is such as will sufficiently account for it, its ideas and consciousness being retained, according to the course of nature: then let it be remembered, who it is that gives the soul this nature; and let that be remembered, which Dr. T. says of the course of nature, before observed; denying, that the course of nature is a proper active cause, which will work and go on by itself without God, if he lets and permits it; saying, that the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or nothing; and affirming, that it is absolutely impossible, the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than produce itself; Page 134. S. and that God, the original of all being, is the only cause of all natural effects. Page 140. S. Here it is worthy also to be observed, what Dr. Turnbull says of the _laws of nature, _as cited from Sir Isaac Newton. Mor. Phil. p. 7. “It is the will of the mind that is the _first cause, _that gives subsistence and efficacy to all those _laws, _who is the _efficient cause _that produces the _phenomena, _which appear in analogy, harmony, and agreement. according to these laws.“ And, “the same principles must take place in things pertaining to _moral _as well as natural philosophy.” Ibid. p. 9.

From these things it will clearly follow, that identity of _consciousness _depends wholly on a law of nature; and so, on the sovereign _will _and agency of GOD. And therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine constitution; and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be the only thing which constitutes oneness of person, but should, besides that, suppose sameness of substance requisite. For, if same consciousness be _one thing _necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God’s sovereign _constitution, _it will still follow that personal identity depends on God’s sovereign constitution.

And with respect to the identity of created substance itself, in the different moments of its duration, I think we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like that absolute, independent identity of the first being, whereby he is _the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. _Nay, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated, that even this oneness of created substance, existing at different times, is a merely _dependent _identity; dependent on the pleasure and sovereign constitution of him who _worketh all in all. _This will follow from what is generally allowed, and is certainly true, that God not only created all things, and gave them being at first, but continually preserves them, and upholds them in being. This being a matter of considerable importance, it may be worthy here to be considered with a little attention. Let us inquire therefore, in the first place, whether it be not evident, that God does continually, by his immediate power, _uphold _every created substance in being; and then let us see the consequence.

That God does, by his immediate power, _uphold _every created substance in being, will be manifest, if we consider that their present existence is a _dependent _existence, and therefore is an _effect _and must have some cause; and the cause must be one of these two; either the _antecedent existence _of the same substance, or else the power of the _Creator. _But it cannot be the _antecedent existence _of the same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of the _moon, _at this present moment, cannot be the _effect _of its existence at the last foregoing moment. For not only was what existed the last moment, no active cause, but wholly a passive thing; but this also is to be considered, that no cause can produce effects in a _time and place _in which itself is _not. _It is plain, nothing can exert itself, or operate, _when _and _where _it is not existing. But the moon’s past existence was neither _where _nor _when _its present existence is. In point of _time, _what is _past _entirely ceases, when _present _existence begins; otherwise it would not be _past. _The past moment has ceased, and is gone, when the present moment takes place; and no more _coexists _with it, than any other moment that had ceased, twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence of the particles of this _moving body _produce effects in any _other place, _than where it then was. But its existence at the present moment, in every point of it, is in a different _place, _from where its existence was at the last preceding moment. From these things, I suppose, it will certainly follow, that the present existence, either of this, or any other created substance, cannot be an effect of its past existence. The existences (so to speak) of an effect, or thing dependent, in different parts of space or duration, though ever so _near _one to another, do not at all _co-exist _one with the other; and therefore are as truly different effects, as if those parts of space and duration were ever so far asunder. And the prior existence can no more be the proper cause of the new existence, in the next moment, or next part of space, than if it had been in an age before, or at a thousand miles’ distance, without any existence to fill up the intermediate time or space. Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be the effect of the _immediate _agency, will, and power of god.

If any shall insist upon it, that their present existence is the effect or consequence of past existence, according to the _nature _of things; that the established _course of nature _is sufficient to _continue _existence once given; I allow it. But then it should be remembered, _what _nature is in created things; and _what _the established _course _of nature is; that, as has been observed already, it is nothing, separate from the agency of God; and that, as Dr. T. says, god, the original of all being, is the only _cause of all natural effects. _A father, according to the course of nature, begets a child; an oak, according to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or a bud; so according to the course of nature, the former existence of the trunk of the tree is followed by its new or present existence. In one case, and the other, the new effect is consequent on the former, only by the _established laws _and settled course of nature; which is allowed to be nothing but the continued immediate efficiency of god, according to a _constitution _that he has been pleased to establish. Therefore, according to what our author urges, as the child and the acorn which come into existence according to the _course of nature, _in consequence of the prior existence and state of the parent and the oak, are truly _immediately _created by God; so must the existence of each created person and thing, at each moment, be from the immediate _continued _creation of God. It will certainly follow from these things, that God’s _preserving _of created things in being, is perfectly equivalent to a _continued creation, _or to his creating those things out of nothing at _each moment _of their existence. If the continued existence of created things be wholly dependent on God’s preservation, then those things would drop into _nothing _upon the ceasing of the present moment, without a new exertion of the divine power to cause them to exist in the following moment. The christian observer, (vol. v. p. 177.) in reviewing a sermon, entitled, “Predestination to Life,” remarks: “It may be allowed, (though even this is not to us in the sense formerly explained, a self-evident proposition,) that all created nature, as such, tends to nihility. Since it sprung out of nothing, only through the intervention of Almighty Power, it must certainly relapse into nothing when the intervening power is removed. Since it became something only during the pleasure of another, it will cease to be something when left to itself. But it is not apparent, why that which never subsisted but in a state of virtue and purity, should of itself have a tendency to subsist in any other state; or why, when left to itself, if it continue at all, it should not continue in that state in which it was left.” But, in p. 186. he retracts what he first said, in the following very singular note: “The preceding sheet was printed off before we perceived that we had expressed ourselves at p. 177. col. 2. in language which may be construed into an admission of the truth of the doctrine maintained by Dr. Williams, as it respects the necessary tendency of all created nature to nihility. In a popular sense, indeed, it may perhaps be said, (though the proposition will be found “to fill the ear rather than the mind,”) that what sprung out of nothing at the pleasure of another, must again become nothing when left to itself; and, for the sake of shortening the discussion, we were willing to concede thus much. We must at the same time confess that we do not quite understand the position, that created beings tend to nihility: and we leave it to our readers to judge whether there be much more meaning in saying that ‘what is tends not to be,’ than in saying that ‘what is not tends to be;’ or, in other words, whether a tendency to annihilation in that which exists, be at all more conceivable, than a tendency to become existent in that which exists not.” How far the writer had any good reason for retracting what he first asserted, and thereby opposing the sentiments, not only of the author he reviews, but of nearly all the divines that ever have written upon providence, let the reader judge by a careful perusal of this chapter. We are ignorant of what Bishop Burnet says on this head, (Art. I p. 30. 3d Ed.) but are well satisfied his notion is as incapable of being supported by sound reason, as it was novel; and as little calculated to support the cause of piety as any one opinion he advances, in his undecisive and latitudinarian exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles. ( See particularly Art. ix. on Original Sin.) For what can be a more heterodox opinion, or more full of horrid impiety, if traced to its just consequences, that the sentiment advanced by that Bishop and by the christian observer! though we are far from supposing that either the one or the other foresaw these consequences. The best excuse we can form for this writer is, that “he does not quite understand the position” against which he writes. This record, we believe, is true; and is equally applicable to several other positions in that article. But then, the public expects from a Reviewer a comprehensive acquaintance with the subject which he criticises, instead of “a wood of words” and inconclusive declamations. However, he seems to be notoriously deficient in comprehending the true state of the question. A great part of that long article consists in proving what was not denied, and in disproving what was never asserted; with a goodly portion of contradictory propositions. We might have expected, that an author who studiously shuns the intricacies of a subject which will, in his apprehension, “descend to posterity with all the difficulties on its head”— a subject, the depth of which “the sounding line of metaphysics will never fathom”—would have kept himself more free from embarrassments and self-contradictions. And it was also to be expected from one who professes to advocate the cause of piety and practical religion, that he should keep aloof from the horrible sentiment suggested by Burnet, in opposition to the almost unanimous verdict of all the pious and learned divines that ever lived. We almost shudder to draw the inference demonstrably implied in the sentiment.—That the world would continue in being, were there no God to uphold it! When we say, that this is the just inference drawn from the sentiment held by the christian observer, we mean, by the individual Reviewer in question, whose critique disgraces that excellent work. Aware, perhaps, that the author whose works we now publish was of the same way of thinking; or at least, that his works have the same tendency with what he opposes, he observes: “We are apt to think that the metaphysical cast which the celebrated Mr. Edwards gave to his writings in divinity, has to a certain degree produced an unfavourable effect on the minds of his followers.” It would have been extremely difficult for this writer to point out any preacher who comes closer in men’s consciences, or any writer who more effectually promotes the interest of genuine, humble, holy, practical religion, than President Edwards; and the editors of his works are fully conscious, that what they publish tends, in the most direct manner, when duly considered and understood, to essential truth—to God: of whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen.—W. If there be any who own, that God _preserves _things in being, and yet hold that they would continue in being without any further help from him, after they once have existence; I think, it is hard to know what they mean. To what purpose can it be, to talk of God _preserving _things in being, when there is no _need _of his preserving them? Or to talk of their being _dependent _on God for continued existence, when they would of themselves continue to exist, without his help; nay, though he should wholly withdraw his sustaining power and influence?

It will follow from what has been observed, that God’s upholding of created substance, or causing of its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an _immediate production out of nothing, _at each moment. Because its existence at this moment is not merely in part from _God, _but wholly from him; and not in any part, or degree, from its _antecedent existence. _For, to suppose that its antecedent existence _concurs _with God in _efficiency, _to produce some _part _of the effect, is attended with all the very same absurdities, which have been shown to attend the supposition of its producing it _wholly. _Therefore the antecedent existence is nothing, as to any proper influence or assistance in the affair: and consequently _God _produces the effect as much from _nothing, _as if there had been nothing _before. _So that this effect differs not at all from the first creation, but only circumstantially; as, in _the first _creation there had been no such act and effect of God’s power before: whereas, his giving existence afterwards, _follows _preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an established order.

Now, in the next place, let us see how the _consequence _of these things is to my present purpose. If the existence of created _substance, _in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God’s immediate power, in _that _moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of _nothing, _then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect; and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method. When I suppose, that an effect which is produced every moment by a new action or exertion of power, must be a new effect in each moment, and not absolutely and numerically the same with that which existed in preceding moments, what I intend, may be illustrated by this example. The lucid colour or brightness of the moon, as we look steadfastly upon it, seems to be a permanent thing, as though it were perfectly the same brightness continued. But indeed it is an effect produced every moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in each successive point of time; and so becomes altogether a new effect at each instant; and no one thing that belongs to it, is numerically the same that existed in the preceding moment. The rays of the sun, impressed on that body, and reflected from it, which cause the effect, are none of them the same: the impression, made in each moment on our sensory, is by the stroke of new rays: and the sensation excited by the stroke, is a new effect, an effect of a new impulse. Therefore the brightness or lucid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing with that which existed in the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now, is individually the same with the sound of the wind that blew just before; which, though it be like it, is not the same, any more than the agitated air, that makes the sound, is the same; or than the water, flowing in a river, that now passes by, is individually the same with that which passed a little before. And if it be thus with the brightness or colour of the moon, so it must be with its solidity, and every thing else belonging to its substance, if all be, each moment, as much the immediate effect of a new exertion or application of power. The matter may perhaps be in some respects still more clearly illustrated thus.—The images of things in a glass, as we keep our eye upon them, seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing perfect identity. But it is known to be otherwise. Philosophers well know, that these images are constantly renewed, by the impression and reflection of new rays of light: so that the image impressed by the former rays is constantly vanishing, and a new image impressed by new rays every moment, both on the glass and on the eye. The image constantly renewed, by new successive rays, is no more numerically the same, than if it were by some artist put on anew with a pencil, and the colours constantly vanishing as fast as put on. And the new images being put on immediately or instantly, do not make them the same, any more than if it were done with the intermission of an hour or a day. The image that exists this moment, is not at all derived from the image which existed the last preceding moment: for, if the succession of new rays be intercepted, by something interposed between the object and the glass, the image immediately ceases: the past existence of the image has no influence to uphold it, so much as for one moment. Which shows, that the image is altogether new-made every moment; and strictly speaking, is in no part numerically the same with that which existed the moment preceding. And truly so the matter must be with the bodies themselves, as well as the images: they also cannot be the same, with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment, if the case be as has been proved, that their present existence is not, strictly speaking, at all the effect of their past existence; but is wholly, every instant, the effect of a new agency, or exertion of the powerful cause of their existence. If so, the existence caused is every instant a new effect, whether the cause be light or immediate divine power, or whatever it be. And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the _arbitrary _constitution of the Creator; who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites these successive new effects, that he _treats them as one, _by communicating to them like properties, relations, and circumstances; and so, leads us to regard and treat them as _one. _When I call this an _arbitrary constitution, _I mean, that it is a constitution which depends on nothing but the divine will; which divine will depends on nothing but the _divine wisdom. _In this sense, the whole _course of nature, _with all that belongs to it, all its laws and methods, constancy and regularity, continuance and proceeding, is an _arbitrary constitution. _In this sense, the continuance of the very being of the world and all its parts, as well as the manner of continued being, depends entirely on an _arbitrary constitution. _For it does not at all _necessarily _follow, that because there was sound, or light, or colour, or resistance, or gravity, or thought, or consciousness, or any other dependent thing the last moment, that therefore there shall be the like at the next. All dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing and returning; renewed every moment, as the colours of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon them; and all is constantly proceeding from god, as light from the sun. In him we live, and move, and have our being.

Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on _God’s sovereign constitution. _And so it appears, that the _objection _we are upon, made against a supposed divine constitution, whereby _Adam _and his _posterity _are viewed and treated as _one, _in the manner and for the purposes supposed—as if it were _not consistent with truth, _because no constitution can make those to be one, which are not one—is built on a false hypothesis: for it appears, that a _divine constitution _is what _makes truth, _in affairs of this nature. The objection supposes, there is a oneness in created beings, whence qualities and relations are derived down from past existence, _distinct _from, and _prior _to, any oneness that can be supposed to be founded on divine _constitution. _Which is demonstrably false; and sufficiently appears so from things conceded by the adversaries themselves: and therefore the objection wholly falls to the ground.

There are various _kinds _of identity and oneness, found among created things, by which they become one in _different manners, respects, _and _degrees, _and to various purposes; several of which differences have been observed; and every kind is ordered, regulated, and limited, in every respect, by _divine constitution. _Some things, existing in different times and places, are treated by their Creator as one in _one respect, _and others in another; some are united for _this communication, _and others for that; but all according to the _sovereign pleasure _of the fountain of all being and operation.

It appears, particularly, from what has been said, that all oneness, by virtue whereof _pollution _and _guilt _from _past _wickedness are derived, depends entirely on a _divine establishment. _It is this, and this only, that must account for guilt and an evil taint on any individual soul, in consequence of a crime committed twenty or forty years ago, remaining still, and even to the end of the world, and for ever. It is this that must account for the continuance of any such thing, and where, as _consciousness _of acts that are past; and for the continuance of all _habits, _either good or bad: and on this depends every thing that can belong to _personal identity. _And all communications, derivations, or continuation of qualities, properties, or relations, natural or moral, from what is _past, _as if the subject were one, depends on no other foundation.

And I am persuaded, that no solid reason can be given, why God—who constitutes all other created union or oneness according to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communications, and effects he pleases—may not establish a constitution whereby the natural _posterity _of _Adam, _proceeding from him, much as the buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as _one _with him, for the derivation, either of righteousness, and communion in rewards, or of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt. I appeal to such as are not wont to content themselves with judging by a superficial appearance and view of things, but are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, that they may judge righteous judgment, whether on supposition that all mankind had co-existed, in the manner mentioned before, any good reason can be given, why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established such an union between Adam and the rest of mankind, as was in that case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the case, that Adam’s posterity had actually, according to the law of nature, some how grown out of him, and yet remained continuous and literally united to him, as the branches to a tree, or the members of the body to the head; and had all, before the fall, existed together at the same time, though in different places, as the head and members are in different places: in this case who can determine, that the Author of nature might not, if it had pleased him, have established such an union between the root and branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute one moral whole; so that by the law of union, there should be a communion in each moral alteration, and that the heart of every branch should at the same moment participate with the heart of the root, be confirmed to it and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as part of the same thing? Why might not God, if he had pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, an union of the various parts of such a moral whole, as well as many other unions, which he has actually fixed, according to his sovereign pleasure? And if he might, by his sovereign constitution, have established such an union of the various branches of mankind, when existing in different places, I do not see why he might not also do the same, through they exist in different times. I know not why succession, or diversity of time, should make any such constituted union more unreasonable, than diversity of place. The only reason, why diversity of time can seem to make it unreasonable, is that difference of time shows, there is no absolute identity of the things existing in those different times: but it shows this, I think, not at all more than the difference of the place of existence.

As I said before, all oneness in created things, whence qualities and relations are derived, depends on a divine constitution that is _arbitrary, _in every other respect, excepting that it is regulated by divine wisdom. The wisdom which is exercised in these constitutions, appears in these two things. _First, _in a beautiful _analogy _and _harmony _with _other _laws or constitutions, especially, relating to the same subject; and _secondly, _in the good _ends _obtained, or useful _consequences _of such a constitution. If therefore there be any objection still lying against this constitution with Adam and his posterity, it must be, that it is not sufficiently _wise _in these respects. But what extreme _arrogance _would it be in us, to take upon us to act as judges of the beauty and wisdom of the laws and established constitutions of the supreme Lord and Creator of the universe! And not only so, but if this constitution, in particular, be well considered, its wisdom, in the two forementioned respects, may easily be made evident. There is an apparent manifold _analogy _to other constitutions and laws, established and maintained through the whole system of vital nature in this lower world; all parts of which, in all successions, are derived from the _first of the kind, _as from their root, or fountain; each deriving from thence all properties and qualities, that are proper to the nature and capacity of the species: no _derivative _having any one perfection, unless it be what is merely circumstantial, but what was in its _primitive. _And that Adam’s posterity should be without that _original righteousness, _which Adam had lost, is also _analogous _to other laws and establishments, relating to the nature of mankind; according to which, Adam’s posterity have no one perfection of nature, in any kind, superior to what was in him, when the human race began to be propagated from him.

And as such a constitution was _fit and wise _in other respects, so it was in this that follows. Seeing the divine constitution concerning the _manner _of mankind coming into existence, was such as did so naturally _unite _them, and make them in so many respects _one, _naturally leading them to a close union in society, and manifold intercourse, and mutual dependence—things were wisely so established, that all should naturally be in one and the same moral state; and not in such exceeding different states, as that some should be perfectly _innocent _and holy, but others _corrupt _and wicked; some needing a _Saviour, _but others needing none; some in a confirmed state of perfect _happiness, _but others in a state of public condemnation to perfect and eternal misery; some justly exposed to great calamities in this world, but others by their innocence raised above all suffering. Such a vast diversity of state would by no means have agreed with the natural and necessary constitution and unavoidable situation and circumstances of the world of mankind; _all made of one blood, to dwell on all the face of the earth, _to be united and blended in society, and to partake together in the natural and common goods and evils of this lower world.

Dr. T. urges, Page 14. that _sorrow and shame _are only for _personal _sin; and it has often been urged, that _repentance _can be for no other sin. To which I would say, that the use of _words _is very arbitrary: but that men’s _hearts _should be deeply affected with grief and humiliation before God, for the pollution and guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think, is not in the least _unreasonable. _Nor is it a thing strange and unheard of, that men should be ashamed of things done by _others, _in whom they are nearly concerned. I am sure, it is not unscriptural; especially when they are justly looked upon in the sight of God, who sees the disposition of their hearts, as fully consenting and concurring.

From what has been observed it may appear, there is no sure ground to conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thing, for the race of mankind truly to partake of the _sin _of the first apostacy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become _their _sin; by virtue of a real _union _between the root and branches of mankind, (truly and properly availing to such a consequence,) established by the author of the whole system of the universe; to whose establishments are owing all propriety and reality of _union, _in any part of that system; and by virtue of the full _consent _of the hearts of Adam’s posterity to that first apostacy. And therefore the sin of the apostacy is not theirs, merely because God _imputes _it to them; but it is _truly _and _properly _theirs, and on that _ground _God imputes it to them.

By reason of the established _union _between Adam and his posterity, the case is far otherwise between him and them, than it is between distinct parts or individuals of Adam’s race; betwixt whom is no such constituted union: as, between children and other ancestors. Concerning whom is apparently to be understood that place, Ezek. xviii. 1-20. Which Dr. T. alleges, p. 10, 11 S. Where God reproves the _Jews _for the use they made of that proverb, “The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge;” and tells them, that hereafter they shall no more have _occasion _to use this proverb; and that if a son sees the wickedness of his _father, and sincerely disapproves it and avoids it, and he himself is righteous, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; that all souls, both the soul of the father and the sin are his, and that therefore the son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor the father bear the iniquity of the son; but the soul that sinneth, it shall die; that the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. _The thing _denied, _is communion in the guilt and punishment of the sins of others, that are distinct parts of Adam’s race; and expressly, in that case, where there is _no consent and concurrence, _but a sincere disapprobation of the wickedness of ancestors. It is declared, that _children _who are _adult _and come to act for themselves, who are _righteous, _and do not approve of, but sincerely condemn, the wickedness of their _fathers, _shall not be punished for their disapproved and avoided iniquities. The _occasion _of what is here said, as well as the _design _and plain sense, shows, that nothing is intended in the least degree _inconsistent _with what has been supposed concerning Adam’s posterity sinning and falling in _his apostacy. _The _occasion _is, the people’s murmuring at God’s methods under the _Mosaic _dispensation; agreeable to that in Levit. xxvi. 39. “And they that are left of you, shall pine away in their iniquity in their enemies’ land, and also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them:” and other parallel places, respecting external judgments, which were the punishments most plainly threatened, and chiefly insisted on, under that dispensation, (which was, as it were, an _external _and _carnal _covenant,) and particularly the people suffering such terrible judgments in _Ezekiel’s _time, for the sins of Manasseh; according to what God says by _Jeremiah, _(Jer. xv. 4.) and agreeable to what is said in that confession, Lam. v. 7. “Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their iniquities.”

In what is said here, there is a special respect to the gospel-dispensation; as is greatly confirmed by comparing this place with Jer. xxxi. 29-31. Under which dispensation, the righteousness of God’s dealings with mankind would be more fully manifested, in the clear revelation then to be made of the method of God’s _judgment, _by which _the final state _of wicked men is determined; which is not according to the behaviour of their particular ancestors; but every one is dealt with according to the sin of _his own _wicked heart, or sinful nature and practice. The affair of _derivation _of the natural corruption of mankind in general, and of their consent _to, _and participation _of, _the _primitive _and _common _apostacy, is not in the least intermeddled with, by any thing meant in the true scope and design of this place in Ezekiel.

On the whole, if any do not like the _philosophy _or the _metaphysics _(as some perhaps may choose to call it) made use of in the foregoing reasonings; yet I cannot doubt, but that a proper consideration of what is apparent and undeniable in _fact, _with respect to the _dependence _of the state and course of things in the universe on the sovereign _constitutions _of the supreme Author and Lord of all—who _gives account _to none _of any of his matters, _and whose ways are past finding out—will be sufficient, with persons of common modesty and sobriety, to stop their mouths from making peremptory decisions against the _justice _of God, respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in _his holy word, _concerning; the _derivation _of depravity and guilt from Adam to his posterity.

This is enough, one would think, for ever to silence such bold expressions as these—“If this be just,—if the _Scriptures _teach such doctrine, &c. then the Scriptures are of _no use—_understanding is _no _understanding,—and, _what _a god must _he _be, that can thus _curse _innocent creatures!— Is _this _thy god, o Christian!”—&c. &c.

It may not be improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this chapter, in which we have had occasion to say so much about the _imputation _of _Adam’s _sin) concerning the opinions of _two divines, _of no inconsiderable note among the _dissenters _in _England, _relating to a _partial imputation _of _Adam’s _first sin.

_One _of them supposes, that this sin, though truly _imputed _to infants, so that thereby they are exposed to a proper _punishment, _yet is not imputed to them in such a _degree, _as that upon this account they should be liable to _eternal _punishment, as _Adam _himself was, but only to _temporal death, or annihilation; Adam _himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely _more guilty _by it, than his posterity. On which I would observe; that to suppose, God imputes not _all _the guilt of _Adam’s _sin, but only some _little part _of it, relieves nothing but one’s _imagination. _To think of poor little _infants b_earing such torments for _Adam’s _sin, as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending in death and annihilation, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their suffering eternal misery for it. But it does not at all relieve one’s _reason. _There is no rule of reason, that can be supposed to lie against imputing a sin in the _whole _of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not personally commit it, but what will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in _part. _For all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the imputation; not the _quantity _or _degree of what is imputed. _If there be any rule of reason, that is strong and good, lying against a proper derivation or communication of guilt, from one that acted, to another that did not act; then it lies against _all _that is of this nature. The force of the reasons brought against imputing Adam’s sin to his posterity (if there be any force in them) lies in this, That Adam and his posterity are not _one. _But this lies as properly against charging a _part _of the guilt, as the whole. For Adam’s posterity, by not being the same with him, had no more hand in a _little _of what was done, than the whole. They were as absolutely free from being concerned in that act _partly, _as they were _wholly. _And there is no reason to be brought, why one man’s sin cannot be justly reckoned to another’s account, who was not then in being, in the _whole _of it; but what will as properly lie against its being reckoned to him in any _part, _so as that he should be subject to any condemnation or punishment on that account. If those reasons are good, all the _difference _is this; that to bring a _great _punishment on infants for Adam’s sin, is a _great _act of injustice, and to bring a comparatively _smaller _punishment, is a _smaller _act of injustice; but not, that this is not as _truly and demonstrably _an act of injustice, as the other.

To illustrate this by an instance something parallel. It is used as an argument why I may not exact from one of my neighbours, what was due to me from _another, _that _he _and _my debtor _are not the same; and that their concerns, interests, and properties are entirely distinct. Now if this argument be good, it lies as truly against my demanding from him a _part _of the debt, as the whole, indeed it is a _greater _act of injustice for me to take from him the _whole _of it, than a part; but not _more truly _and _certainly _an act of injustice.

The _other _divine thinks, there is truly an imputation of Adam’s sin, so that infants cannot be looked upon as _innocent _creatures; yet seems to think it _not agreeable to the perfections of God, _to make the state of infants in another world _worse _than a state of _non-existence. _But this to me appears plainly a _giving up _of that grand point of _imputation, _both in whole and in part. For it supposes it to be not right, for God to bring any _evil _on a child of _Adam, _which is innocent as to personal sin, without _paying for it, _or balancing it with good; so that still the state of the child shall be as _good as could be demanded in justice, _in case of mere _innocence. _Which plainly supposes, that the child is not exposed to any proper _punishment _at all, or is not at all in _debt _to divine justice, on account of _Adam’s _sin. For if the child were truly in _debt, _then surely _justice _might _take something from him, without paying for it, _or without _giving _that which makes its state as _good, _as mere _innocence _could in justice require. If he owes the suffering of some _punishment, _then there is no need that justice should _requite _the infant for suffering that punishment; or _make up for it, _by conferring some _good, _that shall countervail it, and in effect remove and disannul it; so that, on the whole, _good _and _evil _shall be at even _balance, _yea, so that the scale of _good _shall _preponderate. _If it is _unjust _in a judge, to order any quantity of money to be taken from another, without paying him again, and fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly _forfeited none _at all.

It seems to me pretty manifest, that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own a real _imputation _of the guilt of Adam’s first sin to his posterity, without owning that they are _justly _treated as _sinners, _truly guilty, and _children of wrath, _on that account; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the _whole _of the _evil _of that transgression; at least, all that pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the _covenant, _which God had established; even as much as if each one of mankind had the like covenant established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion, violated it for himself.

CHAP. IV.

WHEREIN SEVERAL OTHER OBJECTIONS ARE CONSIDERED.

Dr. T. objects against Adam’s posterity being supposed to come into the world under a _forfeiture _of God’s _blessing, _and subject to his curse through his sin,—That at the restoration of the world after the flood, God pronounced equivalent or greater blessings on Noah and his sons, than he did on Adam at his creation, when he said, be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, &c.*—To this I answer, in the following remarks.

1. As has been already shown, that in the _threatening _denounced for Adam’s sin, there was nothing which appears _inconsistent _with the _continuance _of this _present _life for a season, or with _propagating _his kind; so for the like reason, there appears nothing in that threatening, upon the supposition that it reached Adam’s posterity, _inconsistent _with enjoying the _temporal blessings _of the present life, as long as this is continued; even those temporal blessings which God pronounced on Adam at his first creation. For it must be observed, that the blessings which God pronounced on Adam when he created him, and _before the trial of his obedience, _were not the same with the blessings which were _suspended on his obedience. _The blessings thus suspended, were the blessings of eternal life; which, if he had maintained his integrity through his trial, would have been pronounced upon him afterwards; when God, as his judge, should have given him his reward. God might indeed, if he had pleased, _immediately _have deprived him of _life, _and of all _temporal blessings, _given him before. But those blessings pronounced on him before-hand, were not the things for the obtaining of which his _trial _was appointed. These were _reserved _till the _issue _of his trial should be seen, and _then _to be pronounced in the blessed sentence, which would have been passed upon him by his judge, when God came to decree to him his reward for his approved fidelity. The pronouncing of these latter blessings on a degenerate race, that had fallen under the _threatening _denounced, would indeed (without a redemption) have been inconsistent with the _constitution _which had been established. But giving them the _former _kind of blessings, which were not the things suspended on the trial, or dependent on his fidelity, (and these to be continued for a season,) was not at all inconsistent therewith.

2. It is no more an evidence of _Adam’s _posterity being not included in the threatening denounced for his eating the forbidden fruit, That they still have the _temporal _blessings of fruitfulness, and a dominion over the creatures, _continued _to them; than it is an evidence of Adam being not included in that threatening himself, That _he _had these blessings _continued _to him, was fruitful, and had dominion over the creatures, _after his fall, _equally with his posterity.

3. There is good evidence, that the benedictions God pronounced on Noah and his posterity, were granted on a new foundation; a dispensation _diverse _from any grant, promise, or revelation, which God gave to _Adam, _antecedently to his fall; even on the foundation of the _covenant of grace, _established in Christ Jesus; a dispensation, the design of which is to deliver men from the _curse _that came upon them by Adam’s sin, and to bring them to _greater _blessings than ever _he _had. These blessings were pronounced on Noah and his seed, on the same foundation whereon afterwards the blessing was pronounced on _Abraham _and his seed, which included both spiritual and temporal benefits.—_Noah _had his name prophetically given him by his father _Lamech, _because by him and his seed deliverance should be obtained from the _curse, _which came by _Adam’s _fall. Gen. v. 29. “And he called his name _Noah, (i. e. rest,) _saying, This name shall comfort us concerning our work, and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed.” Pursuant to the scope and intent of this _prophecy _(which indeed seems to respect the same thing with the prophecy in Gen. iii. 15. ) are the blessings pronounced on _Noah _after the flood. There is this evidence of these blessings being conveyed through the channel of the covenant of grace, and by the redemption through Jesus Christ, that they were obtained by sacrifice; or were bestowed as the effect of _God’s favour _to mankind, which was in consequence of _smelling a sweet savour _in the sacrifice which Noah offered. And it is very evident by the epistle to the _Hebrews, _that the ancient sacrifices never obtained the favour of God, but only by virtue of the _relation _they had to the sacrifice of Christ.— Now that _Noah _and his family had been so wonderfully saved from the wrath of God, which had destroyed the rest of the world, and the world was as it were restored from a ruined state, there was a proper occasion to point to the _great salvation _to come by Christ: as it was a common thing for God, on occasion of some great _temporal _salvation of his people, or restoration from a low and miserable state, to renew the intimations of the great _spiritual _restoration of the world by Christ’s redemption. It may be noted, that Dr. T himself signifies it as his mind, that these blessings on Noah were on account of the covenant of grace, p. 84, 90, 91. 92. S. God deals with the generality of mankind, in their present state, far differently, on occasion of the redemption by Jesus Christ, from what he otherwise would do; for, being capable subjects of saving mercy, they have a day of patience and grace, and innumerable temporal blessings bestowed on them; which, as the apostle signifies, ( Acts xiv. 17.) are testimonies of God’s reconcilableness to sinful men, to put them upon seeking after God.

But beside the sense in which the posterity of _Noah _in general partake of these blessings of _dominion over the creatures, _&c. _Noah _himself, and all such of his posterity as have obtained like precious _faith _with that exercised by him in offering his _sacrifice, _which made it a _sweet savour, _and by which it procured these blessings, have _dominion _over the creatures, through Christ, in a more excellent sense than Adam in innocency; as they are _made kings and priests unto God, and reign with Christ, _and _all things are theirs, _by a covenant of _grace. _They partake with Christ in that _dominion over the beasts of the earth, the fowls of the air, and fishes of the sea, _spoken of in the 8th Psalm; which is by the apostle interpreted of _Christ’s _dominion over the world, (1 Cor. xv. 27. and Heb. ii. 7. ) And the time is coming, when the greater part of the posterity of _Noah, _and each of his sons, shall partake of this more honourable and excellent dominion over the creatures, through him _in whom all the families of the earth shall be blessed. _Neither is there any need of supposing that these blessings have their most complete accomplishment, till many ages after they were granted, any more than the blessing on Japhet, expressed in those words, God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem.

But that Noah’s posterity have such _blessings _given them through the great _Redeemer, _who suspends and removes the _curse _which came through Adam’s sin, surely is no argument, that they originally, as in their natural state, are not under the _curse. _That men have blessings _through grace, _is no evidence of their being not justly exposed to the curse by nature; but it rather argues the contrary. For if they did not deserve the _curse, _they would not depend on _grace and redemption _for the removal of it, and for bringing them into a state of favour with God.

Another _objection, _which our author strenuously urges against the doctrine of original sin, is, that it _disparages _the divine _goodness _in giving us our being; which we ought to receive with _thankfulness, _as a great gift of _God’s _beneficence, and look upon as the first, original, and fundamental fruit of the divine liberality. Page 256, 357, 260, 71-74. S.

To this I answer, in the following observations:

1. This argument is built on the supposed _truth _of a thing in dispute; and so is a _begging of the question. _It is built on this supposition, that we are not properly looked upon as _one with our first father, _in the state wherein God at first created him, and in his fall from that state. If we _are _so, it becomes the whole race to acknowledge God’s great _goodness _to them, in the state wherein mankind was made at first; in the _happy _state they were then in, and the fair opportunity they then had of obtaining confirmed and eternal happiness; and to acknowledge it as an aggravation of their apostacy; and to humble themselves, that they were so ungrateful as to rebel against their good Creator. Certainly, we may all do this with as much reason, as the people of Israel in Daniel’s and Nehemiah’s times who did with thankfulness acknowledge God’s great goodness to _their fathers, _many ages before; and in their confessions they bewailed, and took shame to themselves, for the sins committed by their _fathers, _notwithstanding such great goodness. (See the 9th chapter of Daniel, and the 9th of Nehemiah.)

2. If Dr. T. would imply in his objection, that it doth not consist with the _goodness _of God, to give mankind being in a state of _misery, _what ever was done before by Adam, whether he sinned or did not sin. I reply, if it be justly so ordered, that there should be a posterity of Adam, which must be looked upon as one with him; then it is no more contrary to God’s attribute of goodness to give being to his posterity in a state of punishment, than to _continue the being of the same _wicked and guilty person, who has made himself guilty, in a state of punishment. The _giving _of being, and the continuing of being, are both _alike _the work of God’s power and will, and both are alike fundamental to all blessings of man’s present and future existence. And if it be said, it cannot be justly so ordered, that there should be a posterity of Adam, which should be looked upon as _one _with him, this is begging the question.

3. If our author would have us to suppose, that it is contrary to the attribute of goodness for God, in any case, by an immediate act of his power, to cause _evidence, _and to cause _new _existence, which shall be an exceeding _miserable _existence, by reason of exposedness to eternal ruin; then _his own _scheme must be supposed _contrary _to the attribute of God’s goodness: for he supposes that God will raise multitudes from the dead at the last day (which will be giving new existence to their bodies, and to bodily life and sense) in order only to their suffering eternal destruction.

4. Notwithstanding we are so sinful and miserable, as we are by nature, yet we may have great reason to bless God, that he has given us our being under so glorious a dispensation of _grace _through Jesus Christ: by which we have a happy opportunity to be _delivered _from this sin and misery, and to obtain unspeakable eternal _happiness. _And because, through our own wicked inclinations, we are disposed so to neglect and abuse this mercy, as to fail of final benefit by it, this is no reason why we ought not to be _thankful _for it, even according to our author’s own sentiments. What (says he Page 72, 73. S. ) if _the whole world lies in wickedness, _and few therefore shall be saved? Have men no _reason _to be _thankful, _because they are wicked and ungrateful, and abuse their being and God’s bounty? Suppose our own _evil inclinations _do withhold us, _viz. _from seeking after happiness, of which under the light of the gospel we are placed within the nearer and easier reach, “suppose, the whole Christian world should lie in wickedness, and but few Christians should be saved, is it therefore certainly true, that we cannot reasonably _thank _God for the gospel?” Well, and though the _evil inclinations, _which hinder our seeking and obtaining happiness by so glorious an advantage, are what we are _born _with, yet if those inclinations are our fault or sin, that alters not the case: and to say, they are _not _our sin, is still begging the question. Yea, it will follow from several things asserted by our author, that notwithstanding men are _born _in such circumstances, as that they are under a very great _improbability _of ever becoming _righteous, _yet they may have _reason to be thankful _for their being. Thus particularly, Dr. T. asserts, that all men have reason of thankfulness for their being; and yet he supposes, that the _heathen _world, taken as a collective body, were _dead in sin, _and could not deliver or help themselves, and therefore stood in necessity of the christian dispensation. And not only so, but he supposes, that the _christian _world is now at length brought to the _like _deplorable and helpless circumstances, and needs a _new _dispensation for its relief. According to these things, the world in general, not only formerly but even at this day, are dead in sin, and helpless as to their salvation; and therefore the generality of them that are born into it, are much more _likely _to perish, than otherwise, till the _new _dispensation comes: and yet he supposes, we all have reason to be thankful for our being. Yea, further still, I think, according to our author’s doctrine, men may have great reason to be _thankful _to God for bringing them into a state, which yet, as the case is, is attended with _misery, _as its _certain _consequence. As, with respect to God’s _raising _the wicked to life, at the last day; which, he supposes, is in itself a great _benefit, _procured by Christ, and the wonderful _grace _of God through him: and if it be the fruit of God’s wonderful grace, surely men ought to be _thankful _for that grace, and praise God for it. Our doctrine of original sin, therefore, no more disparages God’s goodness in man’s _formation _in the womb, than _his _doctrine disparages God’s goodness in their _resurrection _from the grave.

Another argument, which Dr. T. makes use of, against the doctrine of original sin, is what the Scripture reveals of the process of the day of judgment; which represents the judge as dealing with men _singly and separately, _rendering to _every _man according to _his _deeds, and according to the improvement he has made of the particular powers and talents God has given _him _personally. Page 65, 66, 111. S.

But this objection will vanish, if we consider what is the _end _or _design _of that public judgment. Now this will not be, that God may _find out _what men are, or what punishment or reward is proper for them, or in order to the passing of a right judgment of these things within himself, which is the end of human trials; but it is to _manifest _what men are to their own consciences, and to the world. As the day of judgment is called _the day of the _revelation of the righteous judgment of God; in order to this, God will make use of _evidences, _or _proofs. _But the proper evidences of the wickedness of men’s _hearts _(the true seat of all wickedness) both as to corruption of nature, and additional pollution and guilt, are men’s works.

The special end of God’s public judgment will be, to make a proper, perfect, open _distinction _among men, rightly to state and manifest their _difference _one from another, in order to that separation and difference in the eternal retribution that is to follow: and this difference will be made to appear, by their personal works.

There are two things, with regard to which men will be tried, and openly _distinguished, _by the perfect judgment of God at the last day; according to the twofold _real distinction _subsisting among mankind: viz. (1.) The difference of state; that _primary _and grand distinction, whereby all mankind are divided into two sorts, the righteous and the wicked. (2.) That _secondary distinction, _whereby both sorts differ from others in the _same _general state, in degrees of additional fruits of righteousness and wickedness. Now the Judge, in order to _manifest _both these, will judge men _according to their _personal _works. _But to inquire at the day of judgment, whether _Adam _sinned or no, or whether men are to be looked upon as one with him, and so partakers in his sin, is what in no respect tends to manifest either of these distinctions.

1. _The first _thing; to be manifest, will be the _state, _that each man is in, with respect to the _grand distinction _of the whole world of mankind into _righteous _and wicked; or, in metaphorical language, _wheat _and tares; or, the _children of the kingdom _of Christ, and the children of the wicked one; the latter, the head of the apostacy; but the former, the head of the restoration and recovery. The Judge, in manifesting this, will prove men’s hearts by _their works, _in such as have had opportunity to perform any works in the body. The _evil works _of the children of the _wicked one _will be the proper _manifestation _and evidence or proof of whatever belongs to the general state of such; and particularly they will prove, that they belong to the kingdom of the great deceiver, and head of the apostacy, as they will demonstrate the exceeding corruption of their nature, and full consent of their hearts to the common apostacy; and also that their hearts never relinquished the apostacy, by a cordial adherence to Christ, the great restorer. The Judge will also make use of the _good works _of the _righteous _to show their interest in the redemption of Christ; as thereby will be manifested the sincerity of their hearts in their acceptance of, and adherence to, the Redeemer and his righteousness. And in thus proving the state of men’s hearts by their actions, the _circumstances _of those actions must necessarily come into consideration, to manifest the true _quality _of their actions; as, each one’s talents, opportunities, advantages, light, motives, &c.

2. The other thing to be manifested, will be that secondary distinction,, wherein particular persons, both righteous and wicked, differ from one another, in the _degree _of secondary good or evil; the _degree _of evil fruit, which is additional to the guilt and corruption of the whole body of apostates and enemies; and the _degree _of personal goodness and good fruit, which is a secondary goodness, with respect to the righteousness and merits of Christ, which belong to all by that sincere faith manifested in all. Of this also each one’s _works, _with their circumstances, opportunities, talents, &c. will be the proper evidence.

As to the nature and aggravations of the general apostacy by _Adam’s _sin, and also the nature and sufficiency of the redemption by _Jesus Christ, _the great restorer, though both these will have vast _influence _on the eternal state, which men shall be adjudged to, yet neither of them will properly belong to the _trial _men will be the subjects of at that day, in order to the _manifestation _of their _state, _wherein they are distinguished one _from another. _They will belong to the business of that day no otherwise, than the manifestation of the great _truths _of religion in general; as the nature and perfections of God, the dependence of mankind on _God, _as their creator and preserver, &c. Such truths as these will also have great influence on the eternal state, to which men will then be adjudged, as they aggravate the guilt of man’s wickedness, and must be considered in order to a due estimate of Christ’s righteousness, and men’s personal virtue; yet being of general and equal concernment, will not properly belong to the trial of particular persons.

Another thing urged by our author particularly against the _imputation _of Adam’s sin, is this: “Though, in Scripture, action is frequently said to be _imputed, reckoned, accounted _to a person, it is no other than _his own _act and deed.” Page 3, &c. 105. In the same place he cites a number of places of Scripture, where these words are used, which he says are all that he can find in the Bible.

But we are no way concerned with this argument at present, any further than it relates to _imputation of sin, _or _sinful action. _Therefore all that is in the argument, which relates to the present purpose, is this: that the word is _so often _applied in Scripture to signify God’s imputing of personal sin, but never once to his imputing of _Adam’s _sin.—So often!—How often?—But _twice. _There are but two of all those places which he reckons up, that have any reference to God _imputing _sin to any person, where there is any evidence that only _personal _sin is meant; (Levit. xvii. 3, 4. and 2 Tim. iv. 16.) All therefore that the argument comes to, is this: that the word _impute, _is applied _twice _in Scripture to the case of God imputing sin, and neither of those times to signify the imputing of Adam’s sin, but both times it has reference to _personal _sin; therefore Adam’s sin is not imputed to his posterity. And this is to be noted, that one of these two places, even that in Levit. xvii. 3, 4. does not speak of imputing the _act _committed, but another _not _committed. The words are, “what man soever there be of the house of Israel, that killeth an ox or lamb or goat in the camp, or that killeth it out of the camp, and bringeth it not unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, to offer an offering unto the Lord, before the tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be _imputed _unto that man; he hath shed blood; that man shall be cut off from among his people,” i. _e. _plainly, _murder _shall be imputed to him: he shall be put to death for it, and therein punished with the same severity as if he had _slain a man. It is plain by Isa. lxvi. 3. that, in some cases, shedding the blood of beasts, _in an unlawful manner, was _imputed _to them, as if they slew a man.

But whether it be so or not, although in both these places the word _impute, _be applied to personal sin, and to the very act, or although this could be said of all the places which our author reckons up; yet that the word _impute, _is never expressly applied to Adam’s sin, does no more argue, that it is not imputed to his posterity, than it argues, that pride, unbelief, lying, theft, oppression, persecution, fornication, adultery, sodomy, perjury, idolatry, and innumerable other particular moral evils, are never _imputed _to the persons that committed them, or in whom they are; because the word _impute, _though so often used in Scripture, is never applied to any of these kinds of wickedness.

I know not what can be said here, except one of these two things: that though these sins are not expressly said to be _imputed, _yet _other _words are used that do as plainly and certainly _imply _that they are imputed, as if it were said so expressly. Very well, and so I say with respect to the imputation of Adam’s sin. The thing meant by the word _impute, _may be as plainly and certainly expressed by using other words, as if _that _word were expressly used; and _more certainly, _because the words used instead of it, may amount to an _explanation _of this word. And this, I think, is the very case here. Though the word, _impute, _is not used with respect to Adam’s sin, yet it is said, all have sinned; which, respecting infants, can be true only of their sinning by his sin. And, it is said, by his disobedience many were made sinners; and, judgment and condemnation came upon all by that sin; and that by this means _death, _the wages of sin, _passed on all men, &c. _Which phrases amount to full and precise explanations of the word, impute; and therefore do more certainly determine the point really insisted on.

Or, perhaps it will be said, with respect to those personal sins before-mentioned, _pride, unbelief, _&c. it is no argument they are not _imputed _to those who are guilty of them, that the very word _impute, _is not applied to them; for the _word _itself is _rarely _used; not one time in a hundred, and perhaps five hundred, of those wherein the _thing _meant is plainly implied, or may be certainly inferred. Well, and the same also may be applied likewise, with respect to _Adam’s _sin.

It is probable, Dr. T. intends an argument against original sin, by that which he says in opposition to what R. R. suggests of children discovering the principles of iniquity, and seeds of sin, before they are capable of moral action, Page 77, 78. S. viz. That _little children are mad_e patterns _of humility, meekness, and innocence, _(Matt. xviii. 3. 1 Cor. xiv. 20. and Psal. cxxxi. 2.)

But when the utmost is made of this, there can be no shadow of reason, to understand more by these texts, than that little children are recommended as patterns in regard of a _negative _virtue, innocence with respect to the _exercises _and _fruits _of sin, _harmlessness _as to the hurtful effects of it; and that _image _of meekness and humility arising from this, in conjunction with a natural tenderness of mind, fear, self-diffidence, yieldableness, and confidence in parents and others older than themselves. And so, they are recommended as patterns of virtue no more than _doves, _which are an harmless sort of creatures, and have an _image _of the virtues of meekness and love. Even according to Dr. T.‘s own doctrine, no more can be made of it than this: for his _scheme _will not admit of any such thing as _positive _virtue, or virtuous disposition, in infants; he insisting (as was observed before) that virtue must be the fruit of _thought _and _reflection. _But there can be no thought and reflection, that produces positive virtue, in children not yet capable of moral action; and it is _such _children he speaks of. And that little children have a _negative _virtue or innocence, in relation to the _positive _acts and hurtful effects of vice, is no argument that they have not a _corrupt nature _within them: for let their nature be ever so corrupt, yet surely it is no wonder that they be not guilty of _positive _wicked action, before they are capable of any _moral _action at all. A young viper has a malignant _nature, _though incapable of doing a malignant action, and at present appearing a harmless creature.

Another objection, which Dr. T. and some others offer against this doctrine, is, That it pours contempt upon the human nature. Page 74, 75. S.

But their declaiming on this topic is like addressing the affections and conceits of _children, _rather than rational arguing with _men. _It seems this doctrine is not _complaisant _enough. I am sensible, it is not suited to the taste of some, who are so very _delicate _(to say no worse) that they can bear nothing but compliment and flattery. No _contempt _is by this doctrine cast upon the noble faculties and capacities of _man’s nature, _or the exalted business, and divine and immortal happiness, of which he is made capable. And as to speaking ill of man’s present _moral state, _I presume, it will not be denied, that _shame _belongs to them who are truly sinful; and to suppose, that this is not the _native _character of mankind, is still but meanly begging the question. If we, as we come into the world, are truly sinful, and consequently miserable, he acts but a _friendly _part to us, who endeavours fully to discover and manifest our disease. Whereas, on the contrary, he acts an _unfriendly _part, who to his utmost hides it from us: and so, in effect, does what in him lies to prevent our seeking a remedy from that, which if not remedied in time, must bring us finally to shame and _everlasting contempt, _and end in perfect and remediless destruction hereafter.

Another _objection, _which some have made against this doctrine, much like the former, is, that it tends to beget in us an ill opinion of our fellow-creatures, and so to promote ill-nature and mutual hatred.

To which I would say, if it be truly so, that we all come _sinful _into the world, then our heartily _acknowledging _it, tends to promote humility: but _our disowning _that sin and guilt which truly belongs to us, and endeavouring to persuade ourselves that we are vastly _better _than in truth we are, tends to a foolish self-exaltation and _pride. _And it is manifest, by reason, experience, and the word of God, that _pride _is the chief source of all the _contention, _mutual _hatred, _and _ill-will _which are so prevalent in the world; and that nothing so effectually promotes the _contrary _tempers and deportments, as _humility. _This doctrine teaches us to think no worse of others, than of ourselves: it teaches us, that we are _all, _as we are by nature, _companions _in a miserable helpless condition; which under a revelation of the divine mercy, tends to promote mutual _compassion. _And nothing has a greater tendency to promote those amiable dispositions of mercy, forbearance, long-suffering, gentleness, and forgiveness, than a sense of our own extreme unworthiness and misery, and the infinite need we have of the divine pity, forbearance, and forgiveness, together with a hope of obtaining mercy. If the doctrine which teaches that mankind are corrupt by nature, tends to promote _ill-will, _why should not Dr. T.‘s doctrine tend to it as much? For he teaches us, that the generality of mankind are _very wicked, _having _made themselves so _by their own free choice, without any necessity: which is a way of becoming wicked, that renders men truly worthy of resentment; but the other, _not at all, _even according to his own doctrine.

Another _exclamation _against this doctrine is, that it tends to _hinder comfort and joy, _and to _promote melancholy _and _gloominess _of mind. Page 231, and some other places.

To which I shall briefly say, doubtless, supposing men are really become sinful, and so exposed to the displeasure of God,_ by whatever means, _if they once come to have their eyes opened, and are not very stupid, the reflection on their case will tend to make them sorrowful; and it is _fit _it should. Men, with whom this is the case, may well be filled with sorrow, till they are sincerely willing to forsake their sins, and turn to God. But there is nothing in this doctrine, that in the least stands in the way of comfort and exceeding joy, to such as find in their hearts a sincere willingness wholly to forsake all sin, and give their hearts and whole selves to Christ, and comply with the gospel-method of salvation by him.

Another thing _objected, _is, that to make men believe that wickedness belongs to their very _nature, _tends to _encourage _them in _sin, _and plainly to _lead _them to all manner of iniquity; because they are taught, that sin is _natural, _and therefore necessary and unavoidable. Page 139, and 259.

But if this doctrine, which teaches that _sin _is natural to us, does also at the same time teach us, that it is never the _better, or less to be condemned, _for its being natural, then it does not at all encourage sin, any more than Dr. T.‘s doctrine encourages wickedness when it is become inveterate; who teaches that such as by custom have contracted strong habits of sin, are unable to help themselves. See his exposition on Rom. vii. p. 205 -220. But especially in his paraphrase and notes on the epistle. And is it reasonable, to represent it as encouraging a man in boldly neglecting and wilfully continuing in his _disease, _without seeking a _cure, _to tell him of his disease, to show him that it is real and very fatal, and what _he _can never cure himself of; yet withal directing him to a great _Physician, _who is sufficient for his restoration? But for a more particular answer to what is objected against the doctrine of our natural _impotence and inability, _as being an encouragement to go on in sin, and a discouragement to the use of all means for our help, I must for brevity refer the reader to what has been largely written on this head in my discourse on the Freedom of the Will.

Our author is pleased to advance another notion, among others, by way of _objection _against the doctrine of original sin: that if this doctrine be true, _it would be unlawful to beget children. _He says, Page 145. “If natural _generation _be the means of unavoidably _conveying _all sin and wickedness into the world, it must _itself _be a _sinful and unlawful _thing.” Now, if there be any force of argument here, it lies in this proposition, _whatsoever is a means or occasion of the certain infallible existence of sin and wickedness, must itself be sinful. _But I imagine Dr. T. had not thoroughly weighed this proposition, nor considered where it would carry him. For, God _continuing in being _the devil, and others that are finally given up to wickedness, will be attended, most certainly and infallibly, with an eternal series of the most hateful and horrid wickedness. But will any be guilty of such vile blasphemy, as to say, therefore God’s upholding of them in being is itself a _sinful _thing? In the same place our author says, “so far as we are _generated in sin, _it must be a _sin _to generate.” But there is no appearance of evidence in that position, any more than in this: “So far as any is _upheld in existence _in sin, it is a _sin _to uphold them in existence.” Yea, if there were any reason in the case, it would be strongest in the latter position: for parents, as Dr. T. himself observes, are not the _authors _of the _beginning _of existence: whereas, God is truly the author of the _continuance _of existence. As it is the known will of God, to continue _Satan _and millions of others _in being, _though the most sure _consequence _is the continuance of a vast infernal world, full of everlasting hellish wickedness: so it is part of the revealed will of God, that this world of mankind should be _continued, _and the species _propagated, _for his own wise and holy purposes; which _will is complied with _by the parents joined in lawful _marriage. _Their children, though they come into the world in sin, yet are capable subjects of eternal holiness and happiness: which infinite benefits for their children, parents have great reason to expect, in the way of giving up their children to God in faith, through a Redeemer, and bringing them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. I think, this may be answer enough to such a cavil.

Another _objection _is, That the doctrine of original sin is no _oftener, _and no more _plainly, _spoken of in Scripture; it being, if true, a very _important _doctrine. Dr. T. in many parts of his book suggests to his readers, that there are very _few texts, _in the whole Bible, wherein there is the least appearance of their teaching any such doctrine.

Of this I took notice before, but would here say further: That the reader who has perused the preceding defence of this doctrine, must now be left to judge for himself, whether there be any _ground _for such an allegation; whether there be not texts in _sufficient _number, both in the Old Testament and New, that exhibit undeniable _evidence _of this great article of christian divinity; and whether it be not a doctrine taught in the Scripture with great _plainness. _I think, there are few, if any, doctrines of revelation, taught more plainly and expressly. Indeed it is taught in an explicit manner more in the _New Testament _than in the _Old. _Which is not to be wondered at; it being thus with respect to all the most important doctrines of revealed religion.

But if it had been so, that this doctrine were but _rarely _taught in Scripture; yet if we find that it is _indeed _declared to us by God, if held forth to us by _any _word of his; then what belongs to us, is, to _believe _his word, and _receive _the doctrine which he teaches us; and not to prescribe to him how _often _he shall speak of it, and to insist upon knowing what reasons he has for speaking of it _no oftener, _before we will receive what he teaches us; or to pretend that he should give us an account, why he did not speak of it so _plainly _as we think he ought to have done, _sooner _than he did. In this way of proceeding, if it be reasonable, the _Sadducees _of old, who denied any resurrection or future state, might have maintained their cause against Christ, when he blamed them for not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God; and for not understanding by the Scripture, that there would be a resurrection to spiritual enjoyment, and not to animal life, and sensual gratifications; and they might have insisted, that these doctrines, if true, were very _important, _and therefore ought to have been spoken of in the Scriptures _oftener _and more _explicitly, _and not that the church of God should be left, till that time, with only a _few obscure _intimations of that which so infinitely concerned them. And they might with disdain have rejected Christ’s argument, by way of _inference _from God calling himself in the books of _Moses, _the god of _Abraham, Isaac, _and _Jacob. _For answer, they might have said, that Moses was sent on purpose to teach the people the mind and will of God; and therefore, if these doctrines were true, he _ought in reason and in truth _to have taught them plainly and frequently, and not have left the people to spell out so important a doctrine, only from God’s saying, that he was the God of _Abraham, _&c.

One great _end _of the _Scripture _is; to teach the world _what manner of being _GOD is; about which the world, without revelation, has been so wofully in the dark: and that _God is an infinite being, _is a doctrine of great _importance, _and a doctrine sufficiently taught in the Scripture. But yet, it appears to me, this doctrine is not taught there, in any measure, with such _explicitness _and _precision, _as the doctrine of original sin: and the _Socinians, _who denied God’s omnipresence and omniscience, had as much room left them for cavil, as the _Pelagians _who deny original sin.

Dr. T. particularly urges, that _Christ _says _not one word _of this doctrine throughout the four Gospels; which doctrine, if true, being so important, and what so nearly concerned the great work of redemption, which he came to work out, (as is supposed,) one would think, _it should have been emphatically spoken of in every page, of the Gosp_els. Page 242, 243.

In reply to this, it may be observed, that by the account given in the four Gospels, Christ was continually saying, _those things _which plainly _implied, _that all men in their original state are sinful and miserable. As, when he declared, that they which are whole, need not a physician, but they which are sick; Matt. ix.12. That he came to seek and to save that which was lost. Matt. xviii.11. Luke xix.10. That it was necessary for all to be _born again, _and to be _converted, _and that otherwise they could not enter into the kingdom of heaven; Matt. xviii. 3. **—**and, that all were _sinners, _as well as those whose blood _Pilate _mingled with their sacrifices, &c. and that every one who did not repent, should perish; Luke xiii.1-5. _—_Withal directing everyone to _pray _to God for forgiveness of sin; Matt.vi.12. Luke xi.4. —Using our necessity of forgiveness from God, as an argument with all to forgive the injuries of their neighbours; Matt. vi. 14, 15. —Teaching, that earthly _parents, _though kind to their children, are in themselves evil; Matt. vii. 11. —And signifying, that things _carnal and corrupt _are properly the things of men; Matt. xvi. 23. —Warning his disciples rather to beware of _men, _than of wild beasts; Matt. x.16, 17. —Often representing the world as _evil, _as _wicked _in its works, at _enmity _with _truth _and _holiness, _and hating him; John vii.7, viii.23, xiv. 17, xv. 18, 19. —Yea, and teaching plainly, that all men are extremely and inexpressibly sinful, owing _ten thousand talents _to their divine creditor. Matt. xviii. 21, to the end

And whether Christ did not plainly teach _Nicodemus _the doctrine of original total depravity, when he came to him to know what his doctrine was, must be left to the reader to judge, from what has been already observed on John iii. 1-11. And besides, Christ in the course of his preaching took the most proper method to convince men of the corruption of their nature, and to give them an effectual and practical knowledge of it, in application to themselves in particular, by teaching and urging the holy and strict _law _of God, in its extent, and spirituality, and dreadful threatenings: which, above all things, tends to search the hearts of men, and to teach them their inbred exceeding depravity; not merely as a matter of speculation, but by proper conviction of conscience; which is the only knowledge of original sin, that can avail to prepare the mind for receiving Christ’s redemption; as a man’s sense of his own sickness prepares him to apply in good earnest to the physician.

And as to Christ being no more frequent and particular in mentioning and inculcating this point in a _doctrinal _manner, it is probable, one reason to be given for it, is the same that is to be given for his speaking no oftener of God’s creating of the world: which, though so important a doctrine, is scarce ever spoken of in any of Christ’s discourses; and no wonder, seeing this was a matter which the _Jews, _to whom he confined his personal ministry, had all been instructed in from their forefathers, and never was called in question among them. And there is a great deal of reason, from the ancient _Jewish _writers, to suppose, that the doctrine of original sin had ever been allowed in the open profession of that people; What is found in the more ancient of the Jewish rabbies, who have written since the coming of Christ, is an argument of this. Many things of this sort are taken notice of by Stapferus, in his Theologia Polemica before mentioned. Some of these things which are there cited by him in Latin, I shall here faithfully give in English, for the sake of the English reader. ”—So Manasseh, concerning Human Frailty. p. 129.—Gen viii. 21. I will not any more curse the earth for man’s sake; for the appetite of man is evil from his youth; that is, from the time when he comes forth from his mother’s womb. For at the same time that he sucks the breasts, he follows his lust; and while he is yet an infant, he is under the dominion of anger, envy, hatred, and other vices to which that tender age is obnoxious.”— ”Prov. xxii. 15. Solomon says, Foolishness is bound to the mind of a child.” Concerning which place R. Levi Ben Gersom observes thus, “Foolishness as it were grows to him in his very beginning.” Concerning this sin, which is common and original to all men, David said, Psal. ii. 5. Behold I was begotten in iniquity, and in sin did my mother warm me. Upon which place Ebeb-Ezra says thus: “Behold, because of the concupiscence which is innate in the heart of man, it is said, I am begotten in iniquity. And the sense is, that there is implanted in the heart of man, jetzer harang, an evil figment, from his nativity.” And Manasseh Ben Israel, de Fragil. pag. 2. “Behold, I was formed in iniquity, and in sin hath my mother warmed me. But whether this be understood concerning the common mother, which was Eve, or whether David spake only of his own mother, he would signify, that sin is as it were natural, and inseparable in this life. For it is to be observed, that Eve conceived after the transgression was committed: and as many as were begotten afterwards, were not brought forth in conformity to the rule of right reason, but in conformity to disordly and lustful affections.” He adds, “One of the wise men of the Jews, namely, R. Aha, rightly observed, David would signify that it is impossible, even for pious men who excel in virtue, never to commit any sin.” “Job also asserts the same thing with David, chap xiv. 4. saying, “Who will give a clean thing for an unclean? Truly not one.” Concerning which words Aben-Ezra says thus: “The sense is the same with that, I was begotten in iniquity, because man is made out of an unclean thing.” Stapferus, Theolog. Polem. tom. iii. p. 36, 37. Id. Ibid. p. 132, &c. So Sal. Jarchi ad Gemaram, Cod. Schabbath, fol. 142. p. 2. “And this is not only to be referred to sinners; because all the posterity of the first man are in like manner subjected to all the curses pronounced on him.” And Manasseh Ben Israel, in his preface to Human Fraility, says, “I had a mind to show by what means it came to pass, that when the first father of all had lost his righteousness, his posterity are begotten liable to the same punishment with him.” And Munsterus on the Gospel of Matthew cites the following words, from the book called The Bundle of Myrrh:” The blessed Lord said to the first man, when he cursed him, Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field. The thing which he means is, that because of his sin all who should descend from him, should be wicked and perverse, like thorns and thistles, according to that word of the Lord, speaking to the prophet: Thorns and irritators are with thee, and thou dwellest among scorpions. And all this from the serpent, who was the devil, Sammael, who emitted a mortiferous and corruptive poison into Eve, and became the cause of death to Adam himself, when he eat the the fruit.” Remarkable is the place quoted in Joseph de Voisin, against Martin Raymond, p. 471. of Master Menachem Rakanatensis, sect. Bereschit, from Midrasch Tehillim: which is cited by Hoerndekius, against the Jews, in these words: “It is no wonder, that the sin of Adam and Eve is written and sealed with the king’s ring, and to be propagated to all following generations; because on the day that Adam was created, all things were finished: so that he stood forth the perfection and completion of the whole workmanship of the world: so when he sinned, the whole world sinned; whose sin we bear and suffer. But the matter is not thus with respect to the sins of his posterity.” —Thus far Stapferus. Besides these, as Ainsworth on Gen. viii. 21. observes, “In Bereshith Rabba, a Hebrew commentary on this place, a rabbin is said to be asked, When is the evil imagination put into man? And he answered, From the hour that he is formed.” And in Pool’s Synopsis it is added, from Grotius, “So Rabbi Salomon interprets Gen. viii. 21. The imagination of man’s heart, is evil from his youth, of its being evil from the time that he is taken out of his mother’s bowels.” Aben-Ezra thus interprets Psal. li. 5. “I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me; that evil concupiscence is implanted in the heart from childhood, as if he were formed in it; and by my mother, he understands Eve, who did not bear children till she had sinned. And so Kafvenaki says, How shall I avoid sinning? My ORIGINAL is corrupt, and from thence are those sins. So Manasseh Ben Israel, from this place (Psal. li. 5.) concludes, that not only David, but all mankind, ever since sin was introduced into the world, do sin from their original. To this purpose is the answer of Rabbi Hakkadosch which there is an account of in the Talmud. From what time does concupiscence rule over man? From the very moment of his first formation, or from his nativity? Ans. From his formation.”’—Pool’s Synops. in Loc. On these things I observe, there is the greatest reason to suppose, that these old rabbies of the Jewish nation, who give such heed to the tradition of the elders, would never have received this doctrine of original sin, had it not been delivered down to them from their forefathers. For it is a doctrine very disagreeable to those practical principles and notions, wherein the religion of the unbelieving Jews most fundamentally differs from the religion maintained among Christians: particularly their notion of justification by their own righteousness, and privileges as the children of Abraham. &c. without standing in need of any satisfaction, by the sufferings of the Messiah. On which account the modern Jews do now universally reject the doctrine of original sin, and corruption of nature: as Stapferus observes. And it is not at all likely, that the ancient Jews, if no such doctrine had been received by tradition from the fathers would have taken it up from the Christians, whom they had in such great contempt and enmity; especially as it is a doctrine so peculiarly agreeable to the christian notion of the spiritual salvation of Jesus, and so contrary to their carnal notions of the Messiah, and of his salvation and kingdom, and so contrary to their opinion of themselves; and a doctrine, which men in general are so apt to be prejudiced against. And besides, these rabbies do expressly refer to the opinion of their forefathers; as R. Manasseh says, “according to the opinion of the ancients, none are subject to death, but those which have sinned; for where there is no sin, there is no death.” Stapfer. tom. iii. p. 37, 38. But where we have more direct evidence, that the doctrine of original sin was truly a received doctrine among the ancient Jews, even before the coming of Christ. This appears by ancient Jewish writings, which were written before Christ: as, in the apocrypha, 2 Esdras iii. 21. “For the first Adam, bearing a wicked heart, transgressed, and was overcome: and so be all they that are born of him. Thus infirmity was made permanent; and the law also in the heart of the people, with the malignity of the root; so that the good departed away, and the evil abode still.” 2 Esdras iv. 30. “For the grain of evil seed hath been sown in the heart of Adam, from the beginning; and how much ungodliness hath it brought up unto this time? And how much shall it yet bring forth, till the time of threshing shall come?” And chap. vii. 46. “It had been better, not to have given the earth unto Adam; or else, when it was given to him, to have restrained him from sinning; for what profit is it, for men now in this present time, to live in heaviness, and after death to look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done? For though it was thou that sinned, thou art not fallen alone, but we all that came of thee.” And we read Eccl. xxv. 24. “Of the woman came the beginning of sin, and through her we all die.” As this doctrine of original corruption was constantly maintained in the church of God from the beginning; so from thence, in all probability, as well as from the evidennce of it in universal experience, it was, that the wiser heathens maintained the like doctrine. Particularly Plato, that great philosopher, so distinguished for his veneration of ancient traditions, and diligent inquiries after them. Gale, in his Court of the Gentiles, observes as follows: “PLATO says, (Gorg. fol. 493.) I have heard from the wise men, that are now dead, and that the body is but our sepulchre. And in his Timaeus Locrus (fol. 103) he says, The cause of vitiosity is from our parents, and first principles, rather than from ourselves. So that we never relinquish those actions, which lead us to follow those primitive blemishes of our first parents. Plato mentions the corruption of the will, and seems to disown free will to true good; albeit he allows some (NOT ENGLISH), or natural dispositions, to civil good, in some great heroes. Socrates asserted the corruption of human nature, or (NOT ENGLISH) .—Grotius affirms, that the philosophers acknowledged, it was con-natural to men to sin. Seneca (Benef. 5. 14.) says, wickedness has not its first beginning in wicked practice; though by that it is first exercised and made manifest. And Plutarch (de sera vindictis) says man does not first become wicked, when he first manifests himself so: but he hath wickedness from the beginning; and he shows it as soon as he finds opportunity and ability. As men rightly judge, that the sting is not first engendered in scorpions when they strike, or the poison in vipers when they bite.—Pool’s Synopsis on Gen. viii. 21. To which may be subjoined what Juvenal says, —Admores natura recurrit Damnates fixa et mutari nescia. Englished thus, in prose: Nature, a thing fixed and not knowing how to change, returns to its wicked manners.—WATTS, Ruin and Recovery. though they were generally, in that corrupt time, very far from a practical conviction of it; and many notions were then prevalent, especially among the _Pharisees, _which were indeed inconsistent with it. And though on account of these prejudices they might need to have this doctrine explained and applied to them, yet it is well known, by all acquainted with their Bibles, that Christ, for wise reasons, spake more sparingly and obscurely of several of the most important doctrines of revealed religion, relating to the necessity, grounds, nature, and way of his redemption, and the method of the justification of sinners, while he lived here in the flesh; and left these doctrines to be more plainly and fully opened and inculcated by the Holy Spirit after his ascension.

But if, after all, Christ did not speak of this doctrine often enough to suit Dr. T. he might be asked, Why he supposes Christ did no _oftener _and no more _plainly teach _some of _his, _Dr. T.‘s, doctrines, which he so much insists on? As, that temporal _death _comes on all mankind by Adam; and that it comes on them by him, not as a punishment or calamity, but as a great _favour, _being made a rich benefit, and a fruit of God’s abundant grace, by Christ’s _redemption, _who came into the world as a second Adam for this end. Surely, if this were so, it was of vast _importance, _that it should be _known _to the church of God in all ages, who saw _death _reigning over _infants, _as well as others. If infants were indeed perfectly _innocent, _was it not needful, that the _design _of that which was such a melancholy and awful dispensation towards so many millions of innocent creatures, should be _known, _in order to prevent the worst thoughts of God from arising in the minds of the constant spectators of so mysterious and gloomy a dispensation? But why then such a _total silence _about it, for four thousand years together, and not one word of it in all the Old Testament; nor one word of it in all the four Gospels: and indeed not one word of it in the _whole Bible, _but only as forced and wrung out by Dr. T.‘s arts of criticism and deduction, against the plainest and strongest evidence?

As to the arguments, made use of by many late writers, from the universal _moral sense, _and the reasons they offer from experience, and observation of the _nature _of mankind, to show that we are _born _into the world with principles of virtue; with a natural prevailing relish, approbation, and love of righteousness, truth, and goodness, and of whatever tends to the public welfare; with a prevailing natural disposition to dislike, to resent, and condemn what is selfish, unjust, and immoral; and a native bent in mankind to mutual benevolence, tender compassion, &c. those who have had such objections against the doctrine of original sin thrown in their way, and desire to see them particularly considered, I ask leave to refer them to a _treatise on the _nature _of true _virtue, lying by me prepared for the press, which may ere long be exhibited to public view. See Dissertation concerning the Nature of True Virtue, p. 122.

CONCLUSION.

On the whole, I observe, there are some _other _things, besides arguments, in Dr. T.‘s book, which are calculated to influence the minds, and bias the judgment, of some sorts of readers. Here, not to insist on the profession he makes, in many places, of _sincerity, humility, meekness, modesty, charity, _&c. in searching after truth; and freely proposing his thoughts, with the _reasons _of them, to others; See his Preface, and p. 6. 237, 263, 267, 175. S. nor on his magisterial _assurance, _appearing on many occasions, and the high _contempt _he sometimes expresses of the opinions and arguments of very excellent divines and fathers in the church of God, who have thought _differently _from him Page 110, 125, 150, 151, 159, 161, 183, 188. 77. S. —_both _of which, it is not unlikely, may have a degree of influence on some of his readers—I would take some notice of another thing, observable in the writings of Dr. T. and many of the late opposers of the more peculiar doctrines of Christianity, tending (especially with _juvenile _and _unwary _readers) not a little to abate the force, and prevent the due effect, of the clearest _scripture-evidences _in favour of those important doctrines; and particularly to make void the arguments taken from the writings of the apostle _Paul, _in which those doctrines are more plainly and fully revealed, than in any other part of the Bible. What I mean, is this: These gentlemen express a _high opinion _of this apostle, and that very justly, for his eminent genius, his admirable sagacity, strong powers of reasoning, acquired learning, &c. They speak of him as a writer of masterly address, of extensive reach, and deep design, every where in his epistles, almost in every word he says. This looks exceedingly specious: it carries a plausible appearance of _christian zeal _and attachment to the _Holy Scriptures, _to bear such a testimony of high veneration for that great apostle, who was not only the principal instrument of propagating Christianity, but with his own hand wrote so considerable a part of the New Testament. And I am far from determining, with respect at least to some of these writers, that they are not _sincere _in their declarations; or, that all is mere _artifice, _only to make way for the reception of _their own _peculiar sentiments. However, it tends greatly to subserve such a purpose; as much as if it were designedly contrived, with the utmost subtilty, for that end. Hereby their incautious readers are prepared the more easily to be drawn into a belief, that they, and others in their way of thinking, have not _rightly understood _many of those things in this apostle’s writings, which before seemed very _plain _to them. Thus they are prepared, by a prepossession in _favour _of these _new writers, _to entertain a favourable thought of the _interpretations _put by them upon the words and phrases of this apostle; and to admit in many passages a meaning which before lay entirely out of sight; quite foreign to all that in the view of a common reader seems to be their obvious sense; and most remote from the expositions agreed in by those who used to be esteemed the greatest divines, and best commentators. As to this apostle, being a man of no _vulgar _understanding, it is nothing strange if his meaning lies very deep; and no wonder then, if the superficial observation of vulgar Christians, or indeed of the herd of common divines, such as the _Westminster Assembly, &c. falls vastly short of the apostle’s reach, and frequently does not enter into the true spirit and design of his epistles. They must understand, that the first reformers, _and indeed preachers and expositors in general, for fifteen or sixteen hundred years past, were too _unlearned _and _short-sighted, _to be capable of penetrating into the sense, or fit to make comments on the writings, of so great a man as this apostle; or else had dwelt in a cave of _bigotry _and _superstition, _too gloomy to allow them to use their own understandings with freedom, in reading the Scripture. But, at the same time, it must be understood, that there is risen up now at length, in this happy age of light and liberty, a set of men, of a more free and generous turn of mind, of a more inquisitive genius, and of better discernment. By such insinuations, they seek advantage to their cause; and thus the most unreasonable and extravagant interpretations of Scripture are palliated and recommended: so that, if the simple reader is not very much on his guard, if he does not clearly see with his own eyes, or has too much indolence, or too little leisure, thoroughly to examine for himself, he is in danger of being imposed on with delusive appearances.

But I humbly conceive, that their interpretations—particularly of the apostle Paul’s writings, though in some things ingenious—are in many things extremely absurd, and demonstrably disagreeable, in the highest degree, to _his _real design, to the language he commonly uses, and to the doctrines currently taught in his epistles. Their _criticisms, _when examined, appear far more subtile, than solid; and it seems as if nothing can possibly be strong enough, nothing perspicuous enough, in any composure whatever, to stand before such _liberties _as these writers indulge. The plainest and most nervous discourse is analyzed and criticized, till it either dissolves into nothing, or becomes a thing of little significance. The Holy Scripture is subtilized into a mere mist; or made to evaporate into a thin cloud, that easily puts on any shape, and is moved in any direction, with a puff of wind, just as the manager pleases. It is not in the nature and power of language, to afford sufficient defence against such an art, so abused; as, I imagine, a due consideration of some things I have had occasion in the preceding discourse to observe, may abundantly convince us.

But this, with the rest of what I have offered on the subject, must be left with every candid reader’s judgment; and the _success _of the whole must now be left with God, who knows what is agreeable to his own mind, and is able to make his own truths prevail; however mysterious they may seem to the poor, partial, narrow, and extremely imperfect views of mortals, while looking through a cloudy and delusory medium; and however disagreeable they may be to the innumerable prejudices of men’s hearts:— and who has promised, that the gospel of christ, such as is really _his, _shall finally be victorious; and has assured us, that the _word _which goes out of his mouth, shall not return to him void, but shall accomplish that which he pleaseth, and shall prosper in the thing whereto he sends it.—Let god arise, and plead his own cause, and glorify his own great name. amen.